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Opting Out of Shareholder Governance Rights:
A New Perspective On Contractual Freedom in
Australian Corporate Law
James McConvill* and Mirko Bagaric**
Abstract:
[One of the classic debates in corporate law relates to whether the
rules of corporate law are or should be 'mandatory', in that com-
panies must comply, or 'enabling'- meaning a set of default rules
which companies have the choice of adopting or 'opting out' of
through alternative contractual arrangements. The so-called
'mandatory/enabling' debate has been especially prominent in the
United States for numerous reasons, yet has also received some at-
tention in Australia. That said, the extent to which companies can
'opt out' of corporate law has rarely been considered as a practical
issue in Australia - particularly whether Australian companies can
'opt out' of provisions under the Corporations Act ("the Act").
However, just recently, two high-profile events in Australia have
made 'opting out' of corporate law a relevant issue, especially the
question of whether companies are free to 'opt out' of provisions of
the Corporations Act which provide express governance rights to
shareholders. These events were Boral's constitutional amendment
in 2003 to restrict the ability of shareholders to propose amend-
ments to the company's constitution, and the contemplation and
introduction of so-called 'pre-nuptial' agreements- designed to by-
pass the right of shareholders to vote on removing directors in pub-
lic companies. In light of these two recent events, in this article the
authors revisit the mandatory/enabling debate. However, rather
than going over old ground as to whether a mandatory or enabling
approach to corporate regulation is desirable, the authors ap-
proach the issue from a fresh perspective: that Australian Securites
and Investments Commission's ("ASIC") existing relief powers
under the Act should be extended to provide a means for compa-
nies to opt out of provisions containing shareholder governance
rights.]
* Lecturer in Law, Deakin University Law School.
** Professor and Head of School, Deakin University Law School.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Opting Out - The Intellectual Debate
The ability and desirability of companies to avoid the operation of
corporate law rules by 'opting out', has been one of the more conten-
tious issues in corporate law in the past two decades. Opting out of
corporate law, what has also been described as 'contractual freedom
in corporate law', has engendered lively debate, especially in the
pages of United States law reviews. Opting out emerged as an issue in
the United States as a result of the development of the so-called 'con-
tractarian' theory of the corporation, and an increasing desirability of
United States companies to avoid corporate law rules which were ex-
posing directors to greater liability.
As will be explained in more detail later in this article, contractari-
ans view the corporation not as a separate and distinct legal entity
with its own personality and post office box, but rather as a 'nexus of
contracts', a label representing the series of contracts exchanged and
performed between suppliers, creditors, employees, employers and
other stakeholders. Based on this view of the corporation, as the cor-
poration is not a readily definable entity, the rules of corporate law
are not mandatory like prohibitions on driving on the right side of the
road or running down a public street in the nude, but are default
terms, existing to fill gaps in the series of contracts being exchanged
between stakeholders where stakeholders have not personally
adopted the terms in their contracts.
Accordingly, on this view, companies can comply with the express
rules that have been drafted, or 'opt out' by setting in place their own
arrangements. However, there are questions as to the extent to which
opting out can occur; for example, should this ability apply to all cor-
porate law rules, or should it be limited to rules which do not impact
on third party rights? More generally, there are issues as to whether
corporate law rules actually are enabling in the sense that companies
are free to opt out if they so choose, or merely should be enabling- in
other words, is contractarian analysis operating on a normative level
or a positivist level or both?
In Australia, opting out of corporate law has not received as much
academic attention as in the United States, nor has it been a real issue
in corporate practice. However, quite recently two key events have
made opting out of corporate law an issue both from an academic
perspective, and on a practical level. While these events have not to
date been considered in the context of a classic debate regarding opt-
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ing out of corporate law, in this article the authors will consider the
events from this perspective.
B. Recent Events- Providing a Context
The two recent events which the authors are referring to are a con-
troversial constitutional amendment approved at the 2003 AGM of
Boral Ltd. (setting 5% of voting shares as the minimum threshold for
shareholders to propose an amendment to the company's constitu-
tion), and the use of so-called 'pre-nuptial agreements' by public com-
panies to allow for directors to be removed without having to convene
a general meeting of shareholders to approve the amendment.1
As will be explained in this article, both of these arrangements were
designed to avoid the operation of provisions of the Corporations Act
("the Act") expressing important participatory (or 'governance')
rights of shareholders, based on the argument that this was in the
commercial interests of shareholders. This is a very interesting devel-
opment as governance rights of shareholders have generally been con-
sidered sacrosanct, and thus not subject to any modification or
exclusion by companies- with or without the approval of shareholders.
Indeed, while much has been written about opting out of corporate
law, the great majority of this commentary relates to opting out of
fiduciary duties owed by directors to the company. The authors were
able to find very little in the way of opt out analysis directly relating to
shareholder rights. Hence, when looking at the two recent events
above in the context of opting out, it opens up quite a fresh area for
inquiry regarding the ability and desirability of opting out of corpo-
rate law.
Another interesting point when looking more closely at the two
events is the fact that on both occasions it cannot be said that compa-
nies were treating the Corporations Act as a set of default terms rather
than strictly mandatory rules. Both occasions were not examples of
blatant opting out; rather companies sort to justify the particular ar-
rangements on the basis that they were consistent with the Corpora-
tions Act. This is perhaps why until now the events have not been
considered to be contemporary examples of opt out arrangements.
However, what is clear is that companies were trying to avoid the op-
1. There are other examples which also pop up from time to time. Indeed, it could even be
said that the decision of Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, announced in mid-2004, to move
its corporate headquarters to Delaware USA, a state known for its lax corporate law rules in
relation to shareholder rights, is another example of a company using a mechanism to opt out of
Australian corporate law- and more specifically laws providing important shareholder govern-
ance rights.
2005]
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eration of particular provisions of the Act which were considered to
operate contrary to the commercial interests of the company, provi-
sions which appear on their face to contain mandatory rules, just like
any other ordinary piece of legislation. Hence, the effect of the mea-
sures was essentially the same as opting out, even if they were not
expressed as being opt out arrangements.
C. Opting Out and Contemporary Corporate Governance
In looking at the two recent events from this perspective as indicat-
ing a trend towards opting out of corporate law provisions, and in par-
ticular provisions expressing important governance rights for
shareholders, it is important to consider the extent to which such pro-
visions can be avoided through opt out arrangements, and what can be
done to protect the interests of shareholders. This is especially impor-
tant now that shareholder participation, and more generally upholding
the rights and interests of shareholders, has become a key objective in
corporate law and governance. Both in Australia and overseas, recent
statutory initiatives (for example, CLERP 9 in Australia) and corpo-
rate governance recommendations and policies include measures
which recognize and facilitate a participatory role for shareholders in
the corporation, particularly at the general meeting. However, there is
no use giving greater attention to shareholder participation, and im-
plementing measures with a view to enhancing the participatory rights
of shareholders, if this is countered by a corresponding trend of public
companies blatantly avoiding these provisions through opting out.
D. A 'New' Perspective- Taking Opting Out Public
It was discussed above that the ability and desirability of companies
opting out of statutory provisions containing important governance
rights for shareholders has rarely been considered in commentary on
contractual freedom in corporate law, and there are few examples that
come to mind where legislatures have provided companies with an
avenue to opt out of statutory governance rights provided to share-
holders (Delaware's General Corporation Law is the only prominent
example that comes to mind). 2
From our research, what struck the authors as being even more
rarely discussed is the role (if any) of public regulators in relation to
2. Much as been written in Australia's newspapers in recent times about the comparative
strength of Australian corporate law compared to Delaware corporate law in establishing and
protecting shareholder rights. This commentary was in relation to the proposed move of News
Corporation's headquarters to Delaware, USA. See, e.g., Alan Kohler, Rupert's Shareholders
Lose Out, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 22, 2004, at 25.
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opting out of corporate law. That is, what powers do corporate or se-
curities regulators have to grant exemptions or modifications from
statutory or regulatory corporate law rules, and can the exercise of
such a power, upon the application of a company or individual, be
considered as a mechanism to enable opting out of corporate law? In
other words, if such a dispensation power is attached to a provision in
a piece of companies legislation, is the provision in question still
strictly mandatory or is it appropriate and accurate to say that the
attachment of such a power facilitates 'opting out' of that provision,
and hence the provision is not strictly mandatory?
The impetus for this particular inquiry is the dispensation power
which has been bestowed on the Australian Securities and Invest-
ments Commission ("ASIC") under the Corporations Act. Under the
Act, and as will be explained in more detail below, the ASIC is pro-
vided with the power to grant modifications or exemptions, either on
an individual case-by-case basis upon application, or on a class order
basis, in relation to a number of provisions of the Act. What is inter-
esting though, and what drove the authors to write this article, is the
curious arrangement by which the ASIC has been provided with the
powers. Rather than this power applying to the Act as a whole, and all
the provisions contained in the Act, the power applies selectively to
certain provisions- in particular, provisions regulating takeovers, fun-
draising and (more recently) financial services, but noticeably is not
attached to provisions in the Act expressly providing governance
rights for shareholders.
Indeed, when looking more closely at particular provisions expres-
sing governance rights, and then at the Act as a whole, what becomes
quite clear is that the situation of the ASIC's dispensation powers not
applying to express governance rights of shareholders is deliberate.
The authors trace the origins and development of the ASIC's dispen-
sation powers in the Act and consider why the dispensation power has
traditionally not attached to shareholder rights, and then explore the
issues for consideration if the dispensation power were to be extended
to apply also to provisions containing shareholder rights.
The reason why the authors engage in this exploration is because a
key feature of this article is a proposal to expand the ASIC's dispensa-
tion power to apply to the governance rights of shareholders, in re-
sponse to recent events which suggest that companies want the
flexibility to be able to opt out of these provisions in particular cir-
cumstances. While opting out has traditionally been associated with
'contracting out', that is private ordering negotiated between the com-
pany and its shareholders, the authors argue that there is no practical
259
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or conceptual barrier to characterizing the application of such powers
as being a form of 'opt out'. It is explained that recent events justify
this position.
The basic argument is that shareholder rights are included in the
legislation to protect and respect the position of shareholders of the
company, so that if express shareholder rights are actually operating
contrary to the interests of shareholders in particular circumstances,
shareholders should be given the opportunity to 'opt out' of these
rights if they believe such rights are operating contrary to their best
interests. It is argued that there is no difference in this sense between
the fiduciary duties of directors, for which opt out arrangements have
been readily accepted, and the governance rights of shareholders. The
role of the ASIC as 'gatekeeper' in relation to opting out of share-
holder rights, by ultimately deciding whether or not to approve of an
exemption or modification to a statutory shareholder right, would en-
sure that any dispensation of the rights of shareholders is in fact in the
best interests of shareholders as a whole. At times, shareholders may
be apathetic or misinformed when voting, and thus the oversight of
the ASIC would provide an ultimate protection to shareholders.
E. Brief Outline and Justification of Authors' Proposal
In the final part of the article, the authors will outline in detail the
contents of our proposal, and provide some justification for the propo-
sal. In order to paint a picture, however, of where the authors are
ultimately heading with this article, it is worthwhile to briefly outline
the main points in relation to our proposal for law reform.
What the authors are proposing is that the modification and exemp-
tion powers of the ASIC be extended to apply to the governance
rights of shareholders included in the Corporations Act. Accordingly,
if the company feels that on a particular occasion the strict application
of a statutory shareholder right, like for instance having to call a meet-
ing of shareholders to vote on the removal of a director, is not in their
best interests, companies would have the opportunity to apply to be
exempted from the provision, or for there to be a modification of the
provision. It is important to make clear, however, that the dispensa-
tion power of the ASIC will not be extended to cover every single
governance right of shareholders provided for in the Act. The authors
will list what we believe to be the main governance rights of share-
holders provided for in Act, and indicate which provisions will be sub-
ject to a dispensation power, and which provisions will not be. The
reasons as to why a provision is or is not to be subject to a dispensa-
tion power will be explained.
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Accordingly, if the dispensation power is extended to include these
provisions, companies will be able to apply to the ASIC for an exemp-
tion or modification on a case-by-case basis. It is not proposed that
class order relief will be given, as relief from the operation of particu-
lar shareholder rights will need to be justified based on particular cir-
cumstances present in each company that applies for relief. An
important feature of the authors' proposal, and one that distinguishes
the proposal somewhat from the ordinary operation of the ASIC's dis-
pensation powers, is that the consent of a special majority of share-
holders to the exemption or modification will be a prerequisite to the
ASIC granting relief. The authors will go into more detail below about
what this 'special majority' will entail. It is proposed that this require-
ment, as well as the general procedures involved in the exercise of the
ASIC's dispensation powers, will be expressed in a Policy Statement
which the ASIC will follow and apply in determining whether or not
to grant relief in each given case.
From a regulatory point of view, a strong benefit from this proposal,
if implemented, is that it would encourage real and effective compli-
ance with the Corporations Act, rather than 'opportunistic' compli-
ance (a term that will be explained in the article) which as recent
events have shown, does not provide for effective corporate regula-
tion. Another important benefit of the proposal is that corporate regu-
lation would be more in tune with facilitating the best interests of
shareholders. What the proposal recognizes is that there will be occa-
sions where the strict application of statutory shareholder rights will
not be in the best interests of shareholders. Recent events, particularly
relating to the difficulties in removing a director from the National
Australia Bank due to the requirement to convene a shareholders
meeting pursuant to section 203D to vote on removal, highlight that
this may indeed be the case. Therefore, in such circumstances, share-
holders should be free to opt out of the operation of the statutory
right if they so choose. In giving shareholders this right to choose, and
the right to vote on whether to approve the opt out arrangement, it is
argued that the author's proposal facilitates and promotes shareholder
participation, countering any contrary view that accommodating an
opting out of statutory governance rights of shareholders logically
must undermine shareholder participation.
F. Structure of Article
In Part Two of this article, the authors discuss the two recent events
in Australia suggesting that opting out of corporate law is now on the
agenda. Part Three includes some more background to the issue of
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opting out of corporate law by giving a brief overview of the debate
relating to contractual freedom in corporate law- particularly the is-
sues and arguments raised in academic commentary in the United
States. The authors also examine the Corporations Act in the context
of determining which provisions in the Act are 'mandatory', that is not
subjected to contractual freedom, and those provisions which are not
(that is, 'enabling'). The authors also look at the ability to opt out of
statutory shareholder rights, and discuss the ASIC's powers of exemp-
tion and modification, asking why they have not been discussed before
in the context of opting out of corporate law in Australia.
In Part Four, the authors focus on the ASIC's exemption and modi-
fication powers under the Corporations Act, and outline and then jus-
tify their proposal to extend these powers to attach to a number of
important governance rights of shareholders. Before discussing the
proposal in detail, the authors consider the rationale and origins of the
ASIC's powers, and reflect on the scope of the ASIC's powers in
terms of why the provisions apply to some provisions in the Act but
not others. The authors also examine some issues which need to be
addressed before extending the ASIC's powers. Much of Part Four is,
however, devoted to explaining the authors' proposal. The authors
conclude the article by urging legislators to implement the authors'
proposal on the basis the proposal will be more effective in recogniz-
ing and respecting the rights and interests of shareholders, and in em-
bracing the contemporary corporate governance objective of
enhancing shareholder participation.
II. RECENT EVENTS IN AUSTRALIA: BORAL AND 'PRE-NUPTIAL'
DIRECTOR AGREEMENTS
In the late 1980's and early 1990's, there was extensive academic
analysis in the United States of the whether corporate law rules did or
should facilitate opting out, and many states in that country intro-
duced reforms to their corporations law to allow companies to adopt
opt out arrangements (mainly in relation to fiduciary duties of direc-
tors), usually through making alternative arrangements in the consti-
tution, or through ratification of director's actions by shareholders.
This is explored in more detail in Part Three below. While some com-
mentators in Australia, in particular Ian Ramsay and Michael
Whincop, have incorporated and applied some of this analysis from an
Australian perspective, it could not be said that opting out has been a
major or even contentious issue in Australian corporate law- either
from an academic perspective or at a practical level. An explanation
for why opting out of corporate law inevitably became, and remains,
[Vol. 3:255
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more of an issue in the United States compared to Australia is also
considered in Part Three below.
Indeed, it is fair to say that opting out has not seriously considered
by thinkers and practitioners in Australia- however quite recent
events indicate that this may be changing. Companies in Australia
have been exploring opportunities to avoid the operation of particular
provisions of the Corporations Act, just as companies in the United
States were faced with stronger rules in relation to directors' duties in
the late 1980's and were considering how they could sidestep the stric-
tures of the law. While the authors have not seen any reference to
'opting out' when commenting on these recent events in Australia, this
may simply be due to the fact that opt out has not entered into the
dialogue of corporate lawyers in Australia in the same way as it has in
the United States. In the authors' view, however, when looking at
these events, two in particular, 'opt out' is certainly a label that can be
attached to these arrangements. Contractual freedom may at last be
arriving at the doorstep of Australian corporate law!
A. Boral's 2003 AGM Resolution
At its 2003 annual general meeting ("AGM"), timber and building
products company, Boral Ltd. proposed an extremely controversial
resolution to adopt a new constitution. The new constitution included
a clause that any proposal to modify or repeal the company's constitu-
tion had to be approved either by a resolution of the board or be
proposed by shareholders holding at least 5% of the votes that could
be cast at the meeting.
The reason for including this provision was to negate the right of
100 shareholders of the company to requisition a general meeting to
propose an amendment to the company's constitution (provided for
under section 249D(1) of the Corporations Act), or to give notice of a
resolution that they propose to move at a general meeting (section
249N(1) of the Act). The directors of Boral sought to restrict the
rights of shareholders in this way as a shareholder lobby group, Boral
Green Shareholders (which was established out of a concern about
the effect of Boral's business activities on the environment) had been
quite active in using the 100 member rule to propose a number of
resolutions at Boral shareholders meetings- thus essentially 'hijacking'
the agenda of the company meeting.
Due to this resolution, the 2003 Boral AGM was a fiery encounter,
however as a result of strong institutional investor support, the con-
tentious resolution passed with 94% of votes in favor. The effect of
this resolution was that rather than 100 shareholders being able to
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initiate a resolution to amend the constitution, to be proposed such a
resolution would instead require the backing of shareholders holding
approximately 28 million votes (5% of the issued voting capital in
Boral).
The Labor Party's corporate governance spokesperson, Senator
Stephen Conroy, said that the new rule demonstrated 'an arrogance
towards shareholders and small shareholders in particular .... To lift
this threshold from 100 votes to 28 million votes ... is breathtaking'. 3
The Australian Shareholder Association's Stephen Matthews com-
pared the plight of Boral shareholders to feminist in the late 19th cen-
tury: 'They tried to prevent women getting the vote, just as you are
attempting to prevent small shareholders from putting special resolu-
tions on the notice paper. Shame on you, Mr. Chairman, Shame.' 4
Prior to Boral's resolution at the 2003 AGM, the Federal Govern-
ment had tried unsuccessfully to remove the 100 member threshold in
249D, thus limiting the right of shareholders to requisition general
meetings through a higher threshold tied to a percentage of voting
shares held. As explored further below, section 249D(1A) allows for
the making of Regulations to alter the 100 member rule, as does sec-
tion 249N(1A) in relation to the threshold placing a notice of a resolu-
tion with the company under section 249N(1). The Government
introduced Regulations to amend section 249D in the second half of
2001, however the Regulations were opposed in the Senate. 5 Thus,
Boral's decision to propose the resolution at the 2003 AGM was seen
not only as a response to activist shareholders, but also a frustrated
reaction to the failure of the political process to confine the scope of
section 249D.
The Boral resolution is interesting in the context of the topic of opt-
ing out of corporate law, particularly when considering the legal argu-
ment raised by Boral in support of the resolution. Boral was not
arguing that section 249D or 249N were enabling provisions for which
the company could freely decide whether to comply with or set in
place alternative arrangements in the company's constitution. The
company did not utilize contractarian theory to argue that the Act was
3. Scott Rochfort, Boral Crushes Small Investors' Voices, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 22,
2003, at 21.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Paula Darvas, Section 249D and the "Activist" Shareholder: Court Jester or Con-
science of the Corporation?, 20 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 390, 392 (2000); Simon Milne & Nicola
Wakefield-Evans, Shareholder Requisitions- The 5%/100 Member Provision, 31 AUSTL. Bus. L.
REV. 285 (2003). In early 2005, the Australian Government again announced its intention to do
away with the 100 member rule in section 249D. Draft legislation has been released, however at
the time of writing, the proposed legislation had not been introduced into Parliament.
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merely a set of default rules, or suggest more specifically that the
shareholder rights expressed in sections 249D and 249N were default
terms which the shareholders could vote to dispense with.
Rather, what Boral sought to do was rely on an alternative provi-
sion in the Corporations Act, suggesting that this provision operated
to enable a similar outcome to opting out, without explicitly opting
out of the provision, or indicating that the provision was enabling
rather than mandatory. In legal literature, this is referred to as 'oppor-
tunistic' or 'creative' compliance, which is usually considered less de-
sirable than true compliance. 6 The relevant provision which was relied
upon by the company was section 136(3) which states that a company
can pass a resolution to set in place a 'further requirement' for the
company's constitution to be amended, in addition to the requirement
for a special resolution in section 136(2).
According to Boral, the resolution that any proposal to modify or
repeal the company's constitution needs to be approved by a resolu-
tion of the board or by shareholders holding at least 5% of the votes
that could be cast, merely imposed a further requirement for the
amendment of the constitution going beyond sections 249D and 249N-
the company was not explicitly 'opting out' of the 100 member rule.
Thus, the company could avoid the operation of the 100 member rule,
and thus achieve the same outcome as 'opting out', but the argument
runs that the company was not opting out, but rather was simply com-
plying with the Act which allows companies to introduce further re-
quirements for amending the constitution. In more general terms, it
could be said that the company sought to avoid the operation of the
100 member rule in sections 249D and 249N, yet not by characterizing
the provisions as default terms which the company could comply or
dispense with at its liberty- rather it was prepared to work within the
confines of the Corporations Act to try and find a way to avoid the
operation of 249D and 249N.
However, there remains a very large question mark over whether
Boral's resolution was in fact valid. The clearest and most significant
consequence of the resolution being passed is that 100 shareholders
no longer have the right to propose a resolution, and by implication
call a meeting including this resolution, to amend the company's con-
stitution. Rather, at least 5% of voting shares in the company is the
minimum threshold requirement to requisition a meeting and propose
6. See Simon Deakin & Jacqueline Cook, Regulation and the Boundaries of the Law, U.K.
COMPANY L. REV., Aug. 1999, available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/esrc9.pdf; see also Robert
Campbell, Opportunistic Amendment of the Corporate Governance Contract, 14 COMPANY &
SEC. L.J. 197, 200 (1996).
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a resolution to amend the company's constitution. Accordingly, it can
hardly be said that the resolution does not remove the 100 member
rule, but merely introduces a further requirement. As 100 members
cannot get together and propose a resolution or requisition a meeting,
their right is lost. There is authority for the proposition that section
136(3) cannot be used in this way; a further requirement imposed
under section 136(3) must not be inconsistent with the remaining pro-
visions of the Act.7
Further, at least in relation to section 249D, it is clear that the 100
member rule cannot be limited or ignored. Section 249D(1A) states
that the only way in which the 100 member rule can be changed is by
passing Regulations to this effect; moreover, section 249E states that
if a meeting is not called within 21 days after the directors receive a
request under section 249D, the shareholders can calling a meeting
anyway, with the reasonable expenses of the meeting to be paid by the
company. Both provisions highlight an obvious legislative intention
that the operation of the 100 member rule in section 249D cannot be
negated through a resolution passed under 136(3).
In response to Boral's resolution at the 2003 AGM, in June 2004 the
Labor Party introduced a proposed amendment to the Corporations
Act to make it clear that any further requirement created pursuant to
136(3) must not be inconsistent with the Act, and thus any inconsis-
tent requirement would be void.8 However, the Government did not
agree to the amendment and hence it was not introduced. It may still,
however, be introduced at a later time.
B. 'Pre Nuptial' Agreements for the Removal of Public
Company Directors
A more recent example of companies entering into arrangements
with a view to avoiding the operation of a certain provision(s) of the
Corporations Act related to the process for removing directors of pub-
lic companies.9
The procedures involved in removing directors from public compa-
nies became an issue as a result of a very public boardroom stoush
within the National Australia Bank (NAB) in early 2004, which
erupted as a result of a $360 million foreign currency scandal. The
board of the NAB sought to remove one of its fellow directors, Cathe-
7. See H. A. J. FORD ET AL., FORD'S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATIONS LAW 192 (11th ed. 2003).
8. See Hansard, Senate, June 22, 2004, 24600.
9. See generally, JAMES MCCONVILL, REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: AN
EXPLORATION OF THE CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES, THE CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE LAW REVIEW 191 (2005).
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rine Walter, who had spoken out against the board in relation to its
response to the scandal. Due to section 203D of the Corporations Act,
which states that in public companies the removal of directors must be
approved by an ordinary resolution of shareholders at a general meet-
ing, the board had to organize a general meeting to support a resolu-
tion removing Ms. Walter from the board, rather than being able to
remove Ms. Walter through a simple vote of no confidence (which
would have been possible as 6 out of the 7 directors supported Ms.
Walter's removal). Section 203E of the Act provides that any 'resolu-
tion, request or notice' of the board or a director which purports to
remove a director from office is void. While the meeting was subse-
quently cancelled as Ms. Walter agreed to resign, the organization of
the meeting (in terms of obtaining professional advice, and printing
and distributing information about the meeting to shareholders), and
the bad publicity caused by the stoush which continued throughout
this period, cost the company millions of dollars. This money could
have been saved if the board was simply allowed to remove Ms. Wal-
ter, through a vote of no confidence, when tensions first arose.
In response to the NAB boardroom battle, and the difficulties in-
volved in removing Ms. Walter despite the fact the majority of the
board no longer wanted her to remain a director, it was reported in
July 2004 that a number of 'public companies' had drafted, or were
contemplating introducing, so-called 'pre-nuptial agreements' with in-
coming directors. The basic design of the pre-nuptial agreement was
that the director agreed to resign if the board resolves to pass a vote
of no-confidence in the director, thus avoiding the time and expense
involved in following the procedure for director removal by share-
holder vote under section 203D of the Corporations Act.10
Hence, it can be seen that the pre-nuptial agreements were basically
a mechanism to opt out of the procedure for removal under section
203D. Interesting also, like with the Boral constitutional amendment,
it was not suggested that 203D was merely an enabling provision
which companies were free to opt out of, because clearly it is not. It
contains a mandatory procedure for the removal of directors in public
companies. Instead, again like with Boral, companies endeavoring to
use the agreements were relying on other provisions in the Act to try
and avoid the operation of 203D- here, by structuring the agreements
so that they dealt with 'resignation' by a director rather than 'removal'
by the board, one argument was that the agreements were authorized
10. See, e.g., Annabel Hepworth & Fiona Buffini, Now Governance Spotlight Turns on Boards
of Directors, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Aug. 20, 2004, at 17.
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by section 203A- a replaceable rule which provides that directors can
resign from their position at any time through written notice to the
board.
Therefore, when looking at the Boral amendments and the 'pre-
nuptial' agreements together, it can be said that there is some desire
on the part of Australian public companies to try and avoid the opera-
tion of mandatory rules in the Corporations Act when these rules are
considered to operate contrary to the commercial interests of the
company and its shareholders. 1 More specifically, these recent events
also indicate that while there is some resurgence in the view that there
should be a degree of contractual freedom in corporate regulation,
this is not necessarily based on support for a contractarian view of the
corporation and corporate law. In fact, recent events highlight that
companies do recognize that the Corporations Act contains
mandatory rules, but they are simply trying to avoid the operation of
some rules by relying on alternative rules in the Act. Accordingly, it
could perhaps be said that recent events indicate a trend of 'opportu-
nistic' or 'creative' compliance with the Corporations Act, rather than
a clear and explicit trend of companies opting out of corporate law.
III. 'OPTING OUT' OF AUSTRALIAN CORPORATE LAW: MORE
THAN JUST A MANDATORY/ENABLING DEBATE
It is not intended in this article to go over old ground in terms of
exploring whether corporate law is comprised of mandatory rules or
default terms, or indeed whether corporate law should be made up of
mandatory rules requiring compliance, or default terms by which com-
panies are free to adopt or opt out of through alternative arrange-
ments in the corporate contract. This has been done in sufficient detail
already.12
11. Indeed, Senator Stephen Conroy argued that the Boral amendment '[is a] direct attack on
shareholder's rights and runs counter to the spirit of the Corporations Act 2001.' See Conroy
Crashes Boral Bash, WORKERS ONLINE, Oct. 24, 2003, at http://workers.labor.net.au/200/
news6_boral.html.
12. See, e.g., Ian M. Ramsay, Models of Corporate Regulation: The Mandatory/Enabling De-
bate, in CORPORATE PERSONALITY IN THE 20Tn CENTURY 215 (Ross Grantham & Charles Rick-
ett eds., 1998); Michael J Whincop, Of Fault and Default: Contractarianism as a Theory of Anglo-
Australian Corporate Law, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 187 (1997); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Limiting
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989) [hereinafter Limiting Contractual Freedom]; Lucian Ayre Bebchuk,
The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989); Jeffrey
N Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989); R. C.
Clark, Contracts, Elites and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703
(1989); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (The AEI Press eds.,
1993).
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In order, however, for the reader to understand and appreciate the
fresh perspective that the authors provide in Part Four below on opt-
ing out of corporate law, and more specifically opting out of provi-
sions of the Corporations Act expressing governance rights for
shareholders, it is necessary to at least provide a short background
report on the issue of opting out of corporate law and the models of
corporate regulation in Australia. This is provided below.
A. Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: Opt Out Opt In
The debate relating to opt out of corporate law has principally in-
volved questioning whether corporate regulation is made more effec-
tive through having mandatory rules or enabling rules to deal with
corporate activities and the relationship between corporate stakehold-
ers.13 According to Professor Ian Ramsay ("Professor Ramsay" or
"Ramsay")
A fundamental question is whether [the] functions or goals of cor-
porate law are best achieved with a system of corporate regulation
which is mostly enabling in nature, or mostly mandatory in nature.
What do we mean by these terms? Mandatory rules cannot be va-
ried by the parties. Enabling rules can be.
14
Issues relating to the ability and desirability of opting out of corpo-
rate law became an integral part of academic discourse relating to cor-
porate law as a consequence of the development of a 'contractarian'
analysis of the corporation, which perceives the corporation not as a
separate legal entity, but rather as an abstract entity describing the
series or 'nexus' of contracts negotiated and exchanged between com-
panies and their stakeholders. As a consequence of describing the cor-
poration in this way, the series of constructed rules constituting the
'corporate law' were seen not as mandatory terms, but default provi-
sions to be used as terms in the series of contracts forming the 'corpo-
ration', saving parties the time and expense of drafting the terms
themselves.
13. Issues raised for and against opting out of corporate law rules have been described as
giving rise to a 'mandatory/enabling' debate. See generally, Richard M. Buxbaum, Facilitative
and Mandatory Rules in the Corporation Law(s) of the United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 249
(2002); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Watcher, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and
the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertnert,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87
(1989); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolu-
tion, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 489 (2002); Lucian Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrange-
ments, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713 (2003) [hereinafter Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover
Arrangements]; see also Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565 (1993).
14. Ramsay, supra note 12, at 220-21.
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Many forests have been culled to give commentators the opportu-
nity to explain what a contractarian perspective of the corporation en-
tails, and to explore the consequences of viewing the corporation as a
'nexus of contracts' rather than a separate and distinct legal entity-
including issues to do with opting out of corporate law. In sifting
through the mountain of analysis on contractarianism and opting out,
the clearest explanation of the contractarian theory of the corpora-
tion, and the link between contractarian analysis and the issue of opt-
ing out of corporate law, that the authors encountered was by then
Dean and Professor of Harvard Law School, Robert C. Clark ("Pro-
fessor Clark"), in an article published in the Columbia Law Review.
According to Professor Clark:
The strong form of the contractual theory [of the firm] has three
essential elements. First, the corporation is simply a fictional entity
that serves as the center of a complicated nexus of contractual rela-
tionships. It is wrong to view it as organizing production in a radi-
cally different way than markets do; it is wrong, for example, to see
firms as "hierarchies" in which decisions are made by "fiat" in con-
trast to the contractual arrangements that characterize markets.
And it is wrong to see corporations as being creatures of the state in
any important or fundamental sense.
Second, the proper function of corporate law is simply to provide
an efficient set of starting or "default" rules to govern the nexus of
contracts. Most of these rules concern issues of governance: rights
and duties among directors, officers and investors. Their aim is or
should be to mimic the rules that most managers and investors
would agree to after a full session of costless but informed bargain-
ing....
Third, except when there are bad third- party effects (alias "nega-
tive externalities"), managers and investors should be free to
change any of the default rules by mutual agreement. Moreover,
most rules described traditionally as being within the subject of cor-
porate law, such as the universal rules against unfair self-dealing by
officers and directors or the equally widespread rule against the tak-
ing of corporate opportunities, do not involve any significant third-
party effects; they concern only the welfare of managers and inves-
tors. Consequently, private contracts should almost always domi-
nate over legal rules. . . . To sum up the strong form of the
contractual theory in a motto: Everything is negotiable.15
An important point coming out of Professor Clark's analysis is that
opting out of corporate law has traditionally been associated with a
private contractual arrangement negotiated between the company and
15. Clark, supra note 12, at 1705-06 (emphasis added).
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its shareholders or other stakeholders. 16 Professor Lucian Bebchuk
("Professor Bebchuk"), again of Harvard Law School, also makes this
clear:
The advocates of freedom to opt out start from the view that the
corporation is a contractual creature, a "nexus of contracts". This
view of the corporation, they argue, implies that the parties in-
volved should be generally free to shape their contractual arrange-
ments. The function of corporate law, they claim, should be to
facilitate the process of private contracting by providing a set of
"standard-form" provisions. These standard-form provisions should
not be mandatory; private parties should be free to adopt charter
provisions opting out of them.
17
This characteristic of opting out of corporate law will be explored in
more detail below, given that what the authors are later suggesting is
that the ASIC, a public regulator, does and should play an important
part in facilitating opting out of corporate law rules in Australia.
Another important aspect of contractarian analysis of corporate law
rules is that the analysis operates on both a normative and positivist
level. Contractarians argue both that corporate law rules'are enabling
and default terms which companies are free to opt out of through al-
ternative arrangements in the corporate contract, and that corporate
law should be enabling rather than mandatory- on the basis that con-
tractual freedom in corporate law is more efficient and effective than
having strict, mandatory rules.' 8 Accordingly, there are two different
strands of commentary on opting out of corporate law: descriptive
analysis of the rules which are or are not enabling and subject to opt
out arrangements, and more abstract, academic commentary explor-
ing whether particular forms of corporate law rules should or can be
enabling.
However, opting out of an corporate law does not exist on a purely
academic level- it is also a significant issue that has confronted corpo-
rate lawyers in the real world of practice, again particularly in the
United States. According to the plethora of articles and books on
American corporate law which explore the topic of opting out, the key
16. See also Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting Out of
Securities Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519, 524-25 (1999).
17. See Limiting Contractual Freedom, supra note 12, at 1821.
18. Whincop, supra note 12, at 189. The article provides a good summary of the issues:
Contractarianism has both normative and positive theses. The normative implication of
the theory is that corporate law should be structured as a corpus of default rules, which
the parties may vary or exclude, and not as immutable, mandatory rules. The positive
contractarian thesis asserts that corporate law is organised as a corpus of default rules
and that mandatory rules are not adopted.
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event which triggered the interest of practitioners in the ability to opt
out of corporate law was the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court
in Smith v Van Gorkom,19 which imposed a strict duty of care on di-
rectors. In response to this decision, in 1986 the state of Delaware
amended its companies legislation to enable shareholders of Delaware
companies to limit or eliminate the personal liability of directors for
breaching their duty of care. As Professor Ramsay has written: "A
number of reasons were advanced in support of the amendment.
These included: difficulties in obtaining directors' and officers' liabil-
ity insurance; court decisions holding directors personally liable for
duty of care violations; and perceived difficulties in obtaining and re-
taining directors of the required quality."'20
As Ramsay also indicates in his paper, following the decision of the
state of Delaware in 1986 to enable companies to 'opt out' of stricter
rules imposing personal liability on directors, almost all of the remain-
ing United States states adopted similar legislation to provide for con-
tractual freedom- at least in relation to directors' duty of care.21 The
reaction of the other states to the more liberal and flexible rules per-
taining to directors' duty of care was the result of the 'charter monger-
ing' which occurs in the United States 22- a competition between the
states to have the most attractive corporate law rules for companies
given that companies can chose which state to incorporate in, with
associated taxation and employment benefits which flow to a state
from a company incorporating there. 23 Having in place more lenient
and flexible rules relating to fiduciary duties is attractive to directors
and management deciding on a place to incorporate, and thus such an
19. Smith v. Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
20. Ramsay, supra note 12, at 225.
21. According to Bebchuk, states in the US have also implemented 'default arrangements' in
relation to the regulation of takeover bidders and permitted defensive tactics. See Why Firms
Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, supra note 13.
22. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis, 84
Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 546-48 (1990).
23. See Romano, supra note 12, at 85:
Modern corporation codes tend to be enabling rather than mandatory statutes: they are
standard form contracts specifying the rights and obligations of managers and share-
holders, which can often be altered by private agreement to suit the circumstances of
particular firms. The enabling approach is a function of the contractual nature of the
corporation. Participation in a firm is voluntary; common stock is one of a vast array of
available investment vehicles. . ..
....The mandatory-enabling debate [raises the question]: does state competition pro-
duce too few mandatory corporate laws? Because of the ease of reincorporation, a
provision in one state's code will not be truly mandatory unless it is included in all
other state codes.
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approach to corporate regulation is very important to the state's econ-
omy. As was written by Professor Jeff Gordon of Columbia Law
School:
In light of the competition among states for incorporation ... pri-
vate wealth maximization is likely to be the shaping force of corpo-
rate law. If shareholders and managers perceive that a state's
corporate law does not operate in their joint interest, they can sim-
ply move elsewhere. This is not to deny the importance of regula-
tory objectives, but to suggest that corporate law will tend to
squeeze out those interests.
24
This is why opting out of corporate law is such a huge issue in the
United States, and also why it has not been so significant an issue in
countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom. Corporate law in
both Australia and the United Kingdom is regulated at a federal level,
rather than at the state level. Accordingly, 'charter mongering' is not a
practice which exists in these countries, and thus opting out does not
need to be considered as a practical device to make corporate law
rules more attractive to companies.
There is case law in Australia and the United Kingdom indicating
that there is an avenue for companies to avoid the operation of partic-
ular fiduciary duties of directors to the company, in particular through
shareholder ratification of transactions in breach of directors' fiduci-
ary duties,25 however the legislatures in both countries have not felt
the need to expressly facilitate opt out arrangements in the main com-
panies legislation.26 It is beyond the scope of this article to provide an
24. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 1552.
25. See generally, Deakin & Cook, supra note 6; Pippa Rogerson, Modification and Exclusion
of Directors' Duties, in THE REALM OF COMPANY LAW 93 (Barry K. Rider ed. 1998) (considering
the question whether it should be possible for directors duties to be modified or excluded in the
United Kingdom); Christopher A Riley, Contracting Out of Company Law: Section 459 of the
Companies Act 1985 and the Role of the Courts, 55 MODERN L. REV. 782, 784 n.10 (1992) (ex-
plaining that the introduction of the Companies Act 1989 permits greater freedom for private
companies to contract out of some of the otherwise mandatory provisions of company regula-
tion.) But see BRIAN CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND OPERATION 226
(1997):
Shareholders may authorize a waiver of these duties in certain circumstances but ascer-
taining precisely when this is permitted is not a simple process. One difficulty is deter-
mining the scope of s 310 of the Companies Act 1985. This measure renders invalid any
provision in the corporate constitution or in a contract which exempts corporate offi-
cials from a breach of duty. It would seem, therefore, that a company's articles of asso-
ciation cannot displace the duties which directors owe. Still, section 310's precise ambit
is uncertain. It may be permissible for instance for a company's articles to define and
limit the range of situations where there is an actionable conflict between a director's
personal interests and his duties to the company.
Id.
26. See FORD ET AL., supra note 7. In relation to the position in Australia, it is explained that
there are different considerations that apply to the statutory duties of directors under Part 2D.1
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exploration of the law in relation to opting out of directors' fiduciary
duties.27 What is clear, however, is that in the United States, Australia
and the United Kingdom opting out is discussed almost exclusively in
relation to director's fiduciary duties, and rarely intrudes into other
areas of corporate law- including shareholders rights (discussed
below).28
B. Australia's Corporations Act: A Set of Mandatory or
Default Rules?
1. Models of Corporate Regulation in Australia: An Examination
by Professor Ramsay
In a paper written in 1998 titled 'Models of Corporate Regulation-
The Mandatory/Enabling Debate', 29 Professor Ramsay engaged in a
detailed exploration of Australian corporate law in an attempt to
characterize the number of rules included in the then Corporations
which do not apply to the fiduciary duties of directors, making it less likely that courts would
accept opt out arrangements in relation to the statutory duties. At [8.385], the authors write:
It is clearly envisaged that breaches of Part 2D.1 will be subject to public enforcement
rather than private enforcement of director's duties. Moreover, it is difficult to see rati-
fication by shareholders eliminating a contravention of a statutory duty in Part 2D.1,
particularly given that there can be criminal proceedings resulting from a contravention
of the duties, other than the duty of due care and diligence.
Id.
27. See Whincop, supra note 12, at 222-23 (discussing and analysing the ability to opt out of
fiduciary duties in Australia:
This article has shown that the common law and equity traditionally permitted contrac-
tual variation of the duties imposed on officers on an ex ante basis and allowed con-
tracting around its prohibitions ex post. Statute, however, has greatly restricted ex ante
contracting, except for the conflict rule in proprietary companies and the possibility of
cases where proper purposes are expanded.... This article has shown that common law
and equity treated directors' duties as default rules, which could be modified ex ante
and which courts were sometimes prepared to tailor ex post .... The case law implies
that while fiduciary duties and duties of care permit modification and tailoring, a stan-
dard of good faith limits and informs this process. This analysis supports Coffee's the-
ory that good faith is an essential mandatory principle in officers' liability ... However,
the intensity of the good faith standard varies greatly. In the context of duties of care, it
requires little more than honesty.
Id.
28. For a different perspective on opting out, suggesting that it is possible that opting out of
corporate law could apply more broadly than simply fiduciary duties, see John C. Coffee Jr., No
Exit? Opting Out, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies,
53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 924 (1988). Coffee poses the question, 'Can we find criteria by which to
define a boundary line, separating those areas where contracting out from the common law's
basic norms should be permitted, even in the absence of specific authorizing legislation, from
those components of corporate law that should be viewed as mandatory in character?' Id. Specif-
ically, Coffee suggests that, with an impetus being tort reform in the US, there should be avenues
for ADR mechanisms substitute judicial remedies for shareholders.
29. See Ramsay, supra note 12.
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Law (now Corporations Act), as well as the common law and equity,
as being mandatory or enabling. Professor Ramsay went even further
in classifying the mandatory rules into four different categories: proce-
dural, power allocating, economic transformative and fiduciary stan-
dard setting. 30
Although it is not the purpose of this article to discuss the extent to
which Australian corporate law is mandatory or enabling, or to re-
examine the different types of rules that can be said to exist under the
Corporations Act, it is useful to have some understanding of the ex-
tent to which opting out is presently accommodated in the Corpora-
tions Act before moving on to outline a law reform initiative which is
designed to extend the ability of companies to opt of corporate law
rules contained under this Act. To highlight Ramsay's findings, follow
are extracts of the pertinent points made by Ramsay in his paper:
Although it is relatively easy to identify mandatory rules which
form part of Australian corporate law, it would not be true to say
that Australian corporate law is entirely mandatory, and this in-
cludes certain aspects of directors' duties. The High Court in
Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel Pty Ltd [(1987) 162 CLR 285, 291],
stated that the shareholders of a company may agree to modify the
duties owed by company directors. More particularly, the Court
stated that the articles of a company may be drafted so that they
"expressly or impliedly authorize the exercise of the power of allot-
ment of unissued shares for what would otherwise be a vitiating pur-
pose". . . . Consequently, the basic common law prohibition of
conflicts of interest and duty can be viewed as a 'default rule' which
shareholders in companies are free to modify and which they typi-
cally do modify.
... Other examples of default rules can be provided. Section 249
of the Corporations Law provides that in a company which has
share capital, every member has one vote for each share unless the
articles provide otherwise. It is, of course, very common in private
companies to alter this default rule and to issue shares with different
voting rights attached to them. ...
... Section 164 of the Corporations Law may also be regarded as
a default rule. This section allows persons contracting with compa-
nies to make certain assumptions in regard to those agents and of-
ficers who execute contracts on behalf of companies. In particular,
sections 164(3) allows a person contracting with a company to as-
sume that a person who is held out by the company to be its officer
or agent has been duly appointed and has the authority to exercise
the powers and perform the duties customarily exercised or per-
formed by an officer of the kind concerned .... Section 164 can be
regarded as a default rule because it is possible for the company to
30. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 1591-93.
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vary what is regarded as the customary authority of an officer of the
company...
There are some enabling rules which cannot be classified as de-
fault rules .... Default rules are those which apply unless they are
modified or varied by the parties. Some rules are simply enabling in
the sense that they facilitate corporate transactions. An example is
Section 255 of the Corporations Law which allows members of a
private company to pass resolutions "on paper" without requiring
the formality of a meeting provided all the members of the company
sign the document.
There is another category of enabling corporate rules. These are
rules which allow the court to give effect to the intention of parties
where that intention was thwarted because of some mistake or ir-
regularity. For example, Section 1322 of the Corporations Law pro-
vides that certain matters or proceedings are not invalid because of
irregularities. The court has a discretion whether or not to validate
an irregularity .... Section 194 of the Corporations Law, which al-
lows the court to validate an improper share issue, can be regarded
as an enabling rule which operates to give effect to the intention of
parties where the carrying out of that intention has been thwarted
by an irregularity.31
There are a few points to be made about Professor Ramsay's analysis.
One is that the paper was written prior to the introduction of the 're-
placeable rules' regime under the Company Law Reform Act 1998.
The replaceable rules regime, as will be discussed below, provides a
great deal of contractual freedom to companies in relation to provi-
sions regulating the internal affairs of the company. Another point is
that a number of provisions identified in Professor Ramsay's analysis
have now changed location and the relevant legislation is now the
Corporations Act rather than the Corporations Law, so that the analy-
sis does not precisely reflect the present state of the law. Finally, what
is quite intriguing about Professor Ramsay's analysis is that it includes
some inventive examples of what may be described as enabling rules.
However, there is not a single reference to the ASIC's powers to grant
exemptions or modifications to various provisions in the Act. Is not
this also an example of the Act facilitating opt out arrangements? The
authors consider below why the ASIC's powers have not been consid-
ered in the context of opting out of Australian corporate law.
2. Replaceable Rules
In Professor Ramsay's paper on models of corporate regulation in
Australia, the ultimate finding was that the Corporations Law, now
31. Ramsay, supra note 12, at 222-23.
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Corporations Act, is comprised predominantly of mandatory rather
than enabling rules, far more so than in the United States where 'char-
ter mongering' has meant that there has been a shift towards enabling
rules. Professor Ramsay's characterization of corporate law rules cer-
tainly provides strong justification for this finding, but what confirms
that the Corporations Act consists mainly of mandatory rather than
enabling rules is the replaceable rules regime. The replaceable rules
regime was introduced in 1998. The key objective behind the move to
replaceable rules was to provide a simplified procedure for setting up
and running a company. It is explained in the Explanatory Memoran-
dum to the Company Law Reform Bill 1997 that:
The concept of memorandum of association will be abolished (the
memorandum of existing companies will be treated as part of their
constitution). Also, the adoption of a constitution will be optional.
The basic rules that are available to the internal management of
companies (Table A of the Law) will be updated and moved into
the main body of the Law as replaceable rules. Companies will be
able to adopt a constitution displaying some or all of these rules.
These reforms will reduce the cost of registering a company for the
approximately 80,000 new companies that are registered each
year.32
With this amendment to the Act, a number of provisions (41 to be
precise) regulating the internal affairs of the company (listed under
section 141 of the Act) 33 became 'replaceable rules', meaning that
companies are free to opt out ('replace') a particular replaceable rule
by including an alternative arrangement in the company constitution.
The replaceable rules listed in section 141 of the Act essentially reflect
the rules contained in old Table A to the Corporations Law. The re-
placeable rules apply only to companies that were incorporated after
the introduction of the replaceable rules regime on July 1, 1998, and to
companies incorporated before July 1, 1998 who repeal their existing
constitution. 34 As companies no longer are required to have a consti-
tution, the replaceable rules can entirely govern the internal affairs of
the company if the company so chooses.
32. Explanatory Memorandum, Company Law Reform Bill, 1997, § 2.10(a) (Austl.).
33. Section 141 of the Corporations Act sets out a list of 41 provisions which apply as replacea-
ble rules, which companies can use as their internal governance arrangements. The replaceable
rules are divided into provisions dealing with officers and employees, inspection of books, direc-
tors' meetings, meetings of members, shares and transfer of shares. For a useful discussion of the
replaceable rules regime, in terms of when the replaceable rules will or will not be useful, see
PAMELA HANRAHAN ET AL., COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS OF COMPANY LAW 112-15 (5th ed.
2004).
34. See Corporations Act, 2001, § 135(1) (Austl.).
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As an amendment to the company constitution needs to be ap-
proved by at least 75% of shareholders pursuant to section 136(2) of
the Corporations Act, the replaceable rules regime ensures that there
is strong shareholder involvement in the process of the company or-
ganizing to opt out of one or more of the replaceable rules. The re-
placeable rules regime essentially has the same operation as an opt
out regime in enabling companies to avoid having to follow the proce-
dures in a provision designated as being a replaceable rule. As ex-
plained by Campbell immediately prior to the introduction of the
replaceable rules regime:
The proposed system of 'replaceable rules', part of the Second Cor-
porate Law Simplification Bill, explicitly recognizes this "enabling"
function of the law. The rules relate to governance arrangements
and will have the same effect as provisions of the corporation's
charter. A public corporation will be able to modify or displace
some, but not all, of the rules by provisions of its charter. 35
Accordingly, a logical conclusion to make is that if particular sections
in the Act are specifically designated as being enabling rules, the re-
maining provisions of the Act which are not replaceable rules, and
which do not include an avenue for the company to opt out of (by, for
example, including the statement "unless the company's constitution
provides otherwise"- see, for example, the procedure for varying and
canceling class rights under section 246B) are mandatory provisions.
The replaceable rules regime is discussed in more detail below when
considering why the ASIC's exemption and modification powers only
apply to certain provisions of the Act and not others. Given that the
replaceable rules regime applies to a significant number of provisions
concerning internal governance arrangements in the company, it is
suggested that this may be one reason why the ASIC's powers do not
apply to these provisions. It is also considered whether subjecting ex-
press governance rights of shareholders to contractual freedom should
be achieved through extending the replaceable rules regime or
through extending the ASIC's power to grant exemptions and
modifications.
3. Corporations Regulations- A Means of Opting Out?
Another interesting feature of the Corporations Act which has not
been considered before in Australian commentary on opting out of
corporate law, is the availability of Regulations to modify the opera-
tion of particular provisions under the Act. Regulations to the Corpo-
rations Act are normally drafted upon instruction by the Government,
35. See Campbell, supra note 6, at 206 n.42.
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and only need to be tabled in Parliament rather than following the
same process of approval in both Houses of Parliament which is re-
quired for an actual amendment to the Corporations Act. That is, the
power to make Regulations does not give the Government carte
blanche to amend the Act as they please. All Regulations are capable
of being disallowed by way of a resolution of either House of
Parliament. 36
Under the Corporations Act, some provisions contain a clause au-
thorizing Regulations to be made to modify the operation of the pro-
vision in some way. This regulation-making power is particularly
prominent in Part 2G.2 of the Act which provides shareholders with
some important participatory rights, including to requisition an ex-
traordinary general meeting (section 249D(1)) and to propose a reso-
lution at a general meeting (section 249N) with the support of 100
members (the '100 member rule', discussed in Part Two above). The
100 member rule contained in these, provisions can be modified
through the passage of Regulations relating either to a particular com-
pany or a class of companies. Thus, this power could also be described
as another mechanism in the Act facilitating companies to opt out of
what could otherwise be described as mandatory provisions. However,
as will be discussed later in this article, the ability to make Regulations
is quite different to private arrangements between the company and
its shareholders, or arrangements where the ASIC is involved, to opt
out of statutory provisions. Can it really be said that having to ap-
proach the Government to make Regulations for a provision to be
modified in some way really provides for contractual freedom in cor-
porate law?
4. Opting Out of Shareholder Rights - Rights can be Waived by
Right Holders
As was explained above, commentary to date on opting out of cor-
porate law has almost exclusively related to opting out of fiduciary
duties and director liability. Rarely do we see academic commentary
exploring the desirability of opt out arrangements in relation to share-
holder rights,37 or practical examples of opt out arrangements apply-
36. See Acts Interpretation Act, 1901, § 48(1)(c), (4) (Austl.).
37. One of the rare discussions of opting out of shareholder rights that the authors could find
was a passing reference in Robert C. Clark's discussion of opting out of voting rights. In this
article, Clark discusses the then recent trend in the US of large companies creating capital struc-
tures with dual classes of common stock: a class with superior voting rights (to be held mostly by
management), and a class with no or limited voting rights (to be held by ordinary shareholders),
thus undermining the participatory rights of the second class of shareholders. The impetus for
this structure is that they make hostile takeover bids virtually impossible- in order to get effec-
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ing to statutory provisions containing shareholder governance rights. 38
More recently, there has been some commentary in the United States
on so-called 'optimal default arrangements', arguing that opting out
should be restricted so as not to limit or undermine the rights of share-
holders,39 however this has been discussed in relation to takeover
laws, rather than directly dealing with shareholder governance rights.
There has also been some discussion of opting out of shareholder rem-
edies in the United States, however this is still quite different to opting
out of shareholder governance rights.40
Why has opting out not been given serious attention in relation to
shareholder governance rights? As will be discussed further below, it
tive voting control, a bidder has to buy the superior voting shares held by the incumbent man-
agement. Clark goes on to state in the context of opting out that (at 1711):
A perception that dual class common recapitalizations were unfair to shareholders led
to cries for reform. But the argument that shareholders should be free to contract out
of the traditional one share- one vote arrangement if they saw fit to do so was advanced
with equal vigor. The commentators took a wide variety of positions. Virtually all who
vote or thought about the issue were forced to take a position on whether and when
limits should be imposed on contracting out of corporate law's default rules.
Clark, supra note 12, at 1711 n.22.
For some of the most notable contributions regarding private ordering around the traditional
one share, one vote principle, cited by Clark, see Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the
Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (1987); John C. Coffee, Regu-
lating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in
Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984); see also Clark, supra note 12, at 1708
(suggesting that there may be no basis for distinguishing between fiduciary duties and other
forms of corporate law rules (including shareholder rights) in terms of what may be susceptible
to opt out).
38. Of course, much has been written in the United States about the flexibility of Delaware's
corporate law statute. In that State, many of the express shareholder rights in the legislation are
subject to the phrase, 'unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation', thus facili-
tating the opting out of certain shareholder rights. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 1554.
39. See Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, supra note 13. According to Professor
Bebchuk, default arrangements placing limitations on the rights of shareholders are not desira-
ble. Id. Professor Bebchuk presented this argument in the context of takeovers law, in light of
the recent trend in the US of firms going public placing antitakeover provisions in their IPO
charters (namely poison pills), which in effect place a "board veto" on takeover attempts for the
company, and thus diminish the right of shareholders to vote on the takeover (a key governance
right of shareholders in the US). Id. According to Professor Bebchuk, board veto arrangements
in relation to takeovers are unlikely to serve shareholders in companies with dispersed owner-
ship and should not be chosen as a default. Id.
For an earlier analysis see Melvin Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REv. 1461 (1989) (engaging in a theoretical effort to identify those elements of corporation law
that should remain mandatory. After identifying behavioural rules (such as the duty of care, and
the duty of loyalty) that should be mandatory, Eisenberg adds to this list 'structural rules' which
'double as fiduciary rules' because they address positional (principal-agent) conflicts. Id. at 1480.
According to Eisenberg, these core structural rules fall into several categories. Importantly, the
final set of mandatory structural rules identified by Eisenberg are those which 'protect the integ-
rity of shareholder voting.' Id.
40. See Coffee, supra note 28.
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is most likely based on the view that tinkering with these rights would
inevitably be contrary to the best interests of shareholders. If the
rights of shareholders have been expressly provided for under statute,
does not such an argument make sense? The authors agree that share-
holder participation in the corporation is an important and desirable
objective, but this does not mean that it will always be in the best
interests of shareholders for their statutory governance rights to be
strictly applied. An important characteristic of a 'right' is that the
holder should be able to choose whether or not they want to exercise
that right, and if the strict application of the right will actually operate
contrary to the best interests of the holder of the right, they should
have the opportunity to waive that right. This follows from a basal
aspect of the nature of rights.
Rights by there very nature are controversial, this is so at several
different levels. There is considerable uncertainty not only in relation
to the scope and content of rights, but also to rudimentary issues re-
garding the definition of a right. There is no shortage of definitions
which have been advanced.
Following the work of Wesley Hohfeld,41 there has been much use-
ful discussion in this area. Henry J. McCloskey believes rights to be
simply entitlements, 42 while in Timothy L. S. Sprigge's view 'the best
way of understanding.., that someone has a right to something seems
to be to take it as the claim that there are grounds for complaint on
their behalf if they do not have it'. 43 Still further, rights have been
defined as: claims and entitlements to benefit from the performance of
obligations; 44 'those minimum conditions under which human beings
can flourish [as moral agents] and which ought to be secured for them,
if necessary by force';45 and the liberties each man hath, to use his own
power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature'. 46
41. Wesley N. Hohfeld defined four categories of rights: claim-rights, privileges, powers and
immunities. He qualifies this by stating that a 'claim right' accords with the proper meaning of
the term, right. See WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1919).
42. Henry J. McCloskey, Rights: Some Conceptual Issues, 54 AUSTRALASIAN J. OF PHIL. 99,
115 (1976).
43. TIMOTHY L.S. SPRIGGE, THE RATIONAL FOUNDATION OF ETHICS 216-7 (Routledge &
Kegan Paul Books Ltd. 1987).
44. Geoffrey Marshall, Rights, Options and Entitlements, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRU-
DENCE 228, 241 (Alfred W.B. Simpson (ed. 1973).
45. John Kleinig, Human Rights, Legal Rights and Social Change, in HUMAN RIGrrs 36, 44-45
(Eugene Kamenka and Alice Ehr-soon Tay eds., 1978).
46. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 84-85 (ed. 1946) (1651).
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Finally, Denis J. Galligan defines a right as a 'justified claim that an
interest should be protected by the imposition of correlative duties'. 47
Although for the purpose of this discussion it is not necessary to
examine at length which definition is the most persuasive, it is impor-
tant to note that are three necessary conditions associated with the
definition of a right. The first is that it is universally accepted that a
right is at the bare minimum a positive quality or a 'plus'. None of the
definitions state or even imply that a right could involve a minus or a
disadvantage. As was noted by the High Court in Petty and Maiden v.
R (in the context of discussing the right of pre-trial silence) 'an inci-
dent of that right of silence is that no adverse inference can be drawn
against an accused person by reason of his or her failure to answer
questions or provide information. To draw such an adverse inference
would be to erode the right of silence or to render it valueless' (em-
phasis added). 48
A second core aspect of a right is that it is a presumptive benefit or
protection one can assert against another individual or the community
in general. Presumptive, because it is never indefeasible or absolute.
By benefit, we mean a positive entitlement such as the right to wel-
fare. A protection is a negative entitlement, such as the right to be
free from a particular violation.
The third core aspect of a right, and the most relevant for the pur-
poses of this article, is that it can be waived by the right holder. Rights
by their very nature are individualizing concepts; providing a sphere
of protection for individuals from the wants and needs of others. In-
deed this aspect of rights is at the base of the main general argument
in support of rights-based moral theories. This argument is aptly
stated by John Rawls who claims that only rights- based theories take
seriously the distinction between human beings, and protect certain
interests that are so paramount that they are beyond the demands of
net happiness.49
Linking these elements together it has been argued that a right is a
presumptive benefit or protection one can elect to assert against an-
other individual or the community in general.50 Thus, despite the phil-
osophical uncertainty associated with the nature and content of rights,
it is uncontroversial that in nearly all cases individuals can elect to
47. Denis J. Galligan, The Right to Silence Reconsidered, in CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 69,
88. (1988).
48. Petty v. R, Maiden v. R, (1991) 102 A.L.R. 129 (1991) (emphasis added).
49. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Oxford University Press 1971).
50. See generally, Mirko Bagaric, The Diminishing 'Right' of Silence 19(3) SYDNEY L. REV.
266 (1997).
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relinquish rights.5 l People should be entitled to waive a right where,
according to their own rights, application of the right will adversely set
back their interests.
The relevance of this premise is further developed below when sug-
gesting why the ASIC's exemption and modification powers should be
extended to give shareholders the opportunity to 'opt out' of their
governance rights when it is in their best interests to do so.
C. ASIC's Exemption and Modification Powers: An Open
Invitation to 'Opt Out?
The authors provide a more detailed explanation and analysis of the
ASIC's exemption and modification powers in Part Four below. For
present purposes, it is sufficient to say that under the Corporations
Act, the ASIC is given the power to grant exemptions and modifica-
tions to a number of provisions of the Act- but in particular provisions
dealing with takeovers, fundraising and financial services. Relief in the
form of an exemption or modification can be provided on an individ-
ual case-by-case basis or through a class order.
As will be explained in Part Four, the ASIC's power to grant ex-
emptions and modifications is extremely important in terms of inject-
ing flexibility into the Act, and applications for exemptions and
modifications comprise a significant component of the work of both
the ASIC and corporate lawyers.52 The authors were therefore quite
astonished when researching for this article to find very little in the
way of descriptive and theoretical analysis of the ASIC's powers to
grant relief. Corporate lawyers in Australia have been quick to write
on the intricacies of the Gambotto decision, the implications of Dan-
iels v Anderson and the complexities of Re Wakim, however one of
the, if not 'the', most important aspects of Australian corporate regu-
lation has been close to ignored. Accordingly, it is not surprising that
this power of the ASIC has not been raised for discussion in the con-
text of opting out of corporate law, even though it is commonly uti-
lized to avoid the operation of particular provisions of the Act either
in whole or in part. Quite clearly, use of the ASIC's powers to grant
relief has the same effect of opting out of corporate law, the only dif-
51. There are only a small amount of exceptions to the principle that rights can be renounced
by the right holder. The exceptions are the right to life and, possibly, the right to physical integ-
rity neither of which are relevant for the purposes of this article. See KUMAR AMARASEKARA &
MIRKO BAGARIC, EUTHANASIA, MORALITY AND THE LAW CH. 4 (Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.
2002).
52. See generally, Stephen Bottomley, Where Did the Law Go? The Delegation of Australian
Corporate Regulation 15 AUSTL. J. OF CORP. L. 105 (2003).
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ference being that the company is applying to the corporate regulator
the ASIC for approval to sidestep having to comply with certain pro-
visions of the Act when compliance would be contrary to the commer-
cial interests of shareholders, rather than seeking the approval of
shareholders to do so.
Is it therefore appropriate to classify the ASIC's relief powers as a
formal mechanism in the Act facilitating opt out arrangements?
A very important point to note here is that out of all the articles and
books from a number of different countries that the authors have
read, there is next to no reference to dispensation powers of corporate
or securities regulators as being formal mechanisms facilitating opting
out.53 The only discussion of the role of public regulators in the con-
text of opting out of corporate law was in passing, with no real ac-
knowledgment of the importance of this role.54 While many countries
do not have a corporate regulator similar to the ASIC, or a corporate
regulator vested with the dispensation powers that the ASIC enjoys,
many countries do- so surely there has to be a reason why such an
important aspect of corporate law has previously not been given seri-
ous consideration when discussing opt out arrangements.
In the authors' opinion, undoubtedly the main reason why dispensa-
tion powers of corporate regulators have not been seriously consid-
ered as formal mechanisms facilitating opting out of corporate law is
53. In the US, the point has only been touched on in passing, with recognition that the role of
regulators (amongst other bodies) in the context of opting out 'deserves to be the subject of
scholarly debate': see Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 1851:
Although the main concern of this article to demonstrate the desirability of limits on
midstream opting out rather than in the exact details of implementation, it might still
be useful to note briefly some of the implementation issues that arise in designing these
limits. One question that arises is institutional. With respect to any given issue, which
legal institution should be charged with the role of shaping the standard legal arrange-
ment governing the issue and with selecting those aspects of this arrangement from
which opting out in midstream should not be possible? The options include legislatures
(federal or state), courts, and agencies. (emphasis added)
54. See Coffee, supra note 28, at 972 in which the author gives fleeting consideration to the
possibility of regulators having some involvement in opt outs (through the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ('SEC') approving amendments to stock exchange rules etc), and Bebchuk,
supra note 12, at 1397-9 who comments very briefly on regulatory relief by SEC, as a kind of
'opting out'. Professor Bebchuk writes that:
The freedom-to-opt-out advocates have already had much influence. On the practical
side, they have had an impact on the direction of law reform and law change. The
American Law Institute Reporters, for example, recently proposed permitting opting
out with respect to some significant issues. The SEC recently requested comments on a
proposal to provide companies with substantial freedom to opt of federal takeover rules.
And the state of Delaware recently permitted corporations to adopt charter provisions
that eliminate or restrict director liability for breach of their duty of care. Id. (emphasis
added)
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the company and its shareholders do not have complete freedom to
decide whether or not to opt out of a relevant provision(s) - relief
being dependant on the regulator, e.g. the ASIC, providing consent.
Thus, on this view, attaching a dispensation power to a particular pro-
vision does not alter the mandatory nature of the provision- compa-
nies are required to comply with the provision unless and until the
regulator decides to provide relief. In other words, the ultimate discre-
tion as to whether or not a company will comply or opt out of a provi-
sion is not with the company, but with the regulator.
Accordingly, continuing this argument, there is a fundamental gulf
between traditional private ordering or 'contracting out' of a corpo-
rate law rule by obtaining the approval of shareholders within the cor-
poration, and the operation of a dispensation power by the public
regulator outside of the corporation. The former involves literally opt-
ing out of a corporate law rule, the latter does not involve opting out
of corporate law, but instead entails an alternative form of corporate
law rule- abide by the procedure of obtaining approval by the regula-
tor to be relieved from complying with a specific obligation or proce-
dure in the Act. 55 Put simply, opting out of corporate law must be a
strictly private affair- once there is the 'public' involvement of the reg-
ulator, the arrangement cannot be described as 'opting out' but rather
compliance with an alternative form of corporate law rule.
In the authors' opinion, however, this is a rather specious argument
to run. The authors want to make it quite clear that one can never
truly escape corporate regulation, even if the purpose of an arrange-
ment or legislative initiative is to 'avoid' corporate law rules. To be
able to avoid or limit the application of a corporate law rule to a par-
ticular entity, person or circumstance itself requires some form of con-
senting action for this- either through the enactment or adoption of a
legislative or executive rule authorizing this, or judicial endorsement
of a particular arrangement (e.g., ratification by shareholders of a
55. On this point, Professor Cheffins would not associate regulatory waiver with opting out of
corporate law, but would instead label such a regulatory waiver as the exercise of a 'presumptive
rule'- another form of corporate law rule to a mandatory rule. In his book, supra note 25, at 257,
Cheffins divides corporate law rules into three basic categories: permissive ('may') rules, pre-
sumptive ('may waive') rules and mandatory ('must' or 'must not') rules. Cheffins states that:
Presumptive measures play a central role in this process. Unlike permissive standards,
where opting in is required, laws of the presumptive variety apply unless the parties opt
out. Hence, with issues which company participants have not addressed explicitly in
documentation governing their relations, presumptive rules will apply by default and
thereby fill the contractual gaps.
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transaction in breach of a director's duty to avoid conflicts of
interest) 56
Accordingly, just like an individual's "freedom" in society does not
provide a license to kill a person or steal from others, contractual
"freedom" in corporate law does not exist in its purest possible form-
freedom is necessarily subject to 'boundaries'. Contractual freedom in
corporate law is embraced to provide for flexibility tempered by effi-
ciency, and its reach therefore cannot extend to any opting out ar-
rangements when many of these default arrangements would be
inefficient. Professor John Coffee ("Coffee") once wrote, in an impor-
tant contribution on the judicial role in opting out of corporate law,
that the courts have developed 'standards' which companies endeav-
oring to opt out of particular corporate law rules need to work within
to prevent their default arrangements being struck down by the court
once challenged, thus constructing a boundary around the freedom
that companies have to opt out of particular corporate law rules that
are enabling in nature.57 According to Coffee:
If the new breed of lawyer-economists is to be listened to by the
courts, they must, in turn, listen to how courts think. How then do
courts think about contractual freedom and opting out? Clearly,
they do not view statutory corporate law as simply a body of default
rules, which shareholders may waive at will. Rather, courts exercise
substantial discretion to accept or reject a contractual innovation,
depending upon whether they attribute a "fat" or a "thin" policy to
the statutory norm asserted to be in conflict with the charter provi-
sion. As a statute begins to seem obsolete or superfluous, courts
have recurrently shown a willingness to shirk their conception of its
56. See Black, supra note 22, at 584 (On the judicial role in opting out of corporate law, Black
describes judicial power to interpret legal rules broadly or narrowly as a "counterweight" to
legislative accommodation to "corporate preferences"). Id. See also Sandra K Miller, The Role
of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the Need for Mandatory Constraints on Op-
portunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609 (2004) (explaining how in
the context of LLC's (limited-liability companies), courts are developing minimum standards of
conduct through restricted interpretation of contractual waivers, vigorous application of the 'en-
tire fairness standard', and recourse to contractually broad concepts of good faith). Id. See also
Michael J Whincop, The Immanent Conservatism of Corporate Adjudication: Thoughts on Kings-
ford Smith's 'Interpreting the Corporations Law' 22 SYDNEY L. REV. 273 (2000) (for an Austra-
lan perspective on the judicial role).
Because the forms of opportunism vary between contracts, the freedom to contract in
relation to matters of governance is strongly desirable. There is ample doctrinal proof
that until statute intervened and gradually removed those freedoms, the law took a
highly enabling approach to governance, including changes to or amendments of legal
principles and duties. The law was characterised by a strong preference for resolving
particular issues by ongoing private ordering and dispute resolution. Id at 279-80.
57. See John C. Coffee, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law - The Mandatory/Enabling
Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989).
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underlying policy, but only on a few occasions have courts con-
verted a mandatory norm into a default one.
58
In his article, Coffee considers the cases where courts have been con-
fronted with attempts to contract out of corporate law, and attempts
to understand how courts might and should respond to innovative de-
partures from the 'traditional norms of corporate governance'. The
article also focuses on the process of statutory interpretation and asks
when, if ever, courts should make new mandatory rules or change old
default rules. In reviewing the cases, Coffee explains that it can be
seen that the courts develop standards for opting out so that share-
holders are not able to opt at will- and makes it clear that it cannot
therefore be said that there is complete contractual freedom.
59 One
example Coffee provides to support his contention is judicial decisions
indicating that the courts prefer transaction-specific modifications or
exemptions from fiduciary duties as opposed to ongoing relief.60 Fur-
thermore, opting out of fiduciary duties has always been subject to the
limitation that directors continue to meet a standard of good faith in
their commercial behavior.
61
In light of the above, the authors believe that there is no conceptual
barrier to labeling dispensation powers of a corporate regulator, and
particularly the ASIC's power to grant exemptions and modifications,
58. Id. at 1690.
59. Id. at 1665.
60. Id. at 1677.
61. Id. at 1655-6. Given this role of the courts in setting the standards for opting out to ulti-
mately protect shareholders and provide for effective corporate regulation, Coffee constructs a
proposed 'black letter' rule providing an exploratory vehicle 'by which to examine possible
trade-offs between the desire to permit innovation and the fear of opportunism'. Coffee ex-
plains the rule (comprised of five basic limitations), and then makes reference to a series of cases
which have adopted aspects of the various approaches contained in the rule. Coffee states:
A court should uphold and give effect to a contractual provision that would otherwise
be deemed invalid as in conflict with the corporate law of the jurisdiction if and only if:
(1) the provision does not:
(A) reduce or restrict the obligation of persons occupying a fiduciary relationship
to the corporation to deal fairly and to act in good faith; or
(B) conflict with the clear purpose of any statutory provision or with an estab-
lished public policy intended to protect persons or interests other than
shareholders;
(2) either the provision:
(A) is sufficiently specific and limited in its application that the parties reasonably
could believe it would better serve their interests;
(3) if the provision was adopted by a charter amendment, it was approved by a disin-
terested majority of the shareholders under circumstances where a rejection of the
amendment would not cause them to be worse off than they were prior to the
proposal of the amendment. Id.
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as a formal mechanism to 'opt out' of corporate law rules.62 There is
no major difference between a private arrangement between the com-
pany and its shareholders or some other stakeholder which is subject
to court challenge if constructed in a manner operating outside the
realm of traditional norms of corporate governance (e.g. allowing
commercial behavior by directors which does not comply with stan-
dards of good faith), and the power of a corporate regulator to grant
an exception or modification to a particular company from the opera-
tion of a corporate law rule.
Both mechanisms are subject to supervision, explicitly or implicitly,
by a public body- placing limits on the discretion of the company; both
mechanisms allow for the avoidance of a corporate law rule(s) in par-
ticular circumstances; both mechanisms are designed to ultimately ac-
commodate a greater sense of flexibility and efficiency in corporate
regulation; and both mechanisms are themselves constructed by a cor-
porate law rule and thus ultimately operate inside rather than outside
62. This view is also supported by the unique nature, or 'peculiarities', of relational contracts
(typically arrangements between the company and its shareholders- including arrangements to
amend the company constitution- and thus also labeled 'inter-shareholder contracts') which are
the mechanism usually used to opt out through private ordering. As discussed in Riley, supra
note 25, some judicial and legislative intervention is a necessary characteristic in order to effec-
tively organize the various relationships and interests involved in such contracting. According to
Riley:
[A]lthough contracts provide the most appropriate theoretical framework for conceptu-
alising the inter-shareholder relationship, the precise nature of this contract, and more
importantly its normative treatment, can be understood only in the context of the spe-
cific and peculiar nature of that relationship itself. Ordinary contractual analysis ...
applies uneasily here. In consequence, the corporate contract is characterised by a pro-
cess of active judicial construction rather than mere passive judicial discovery, a construc-
tive process in which contractual freedom becomes, of necessity, limited. Id. at 785 [The
necessary limitations of contractual freedom in this sense is the main point which is to
emphasized]
The article goes on to say that agreements between shareholders represent a typical long-term
relational contract, where the parties are bound together and do business over a long period of
time, therefore requiring different considerations than for discrete, on-off agreements.
[W]hilst the relationship between shareholders might be described as contractual, that
label needs adapting to the peculiarities of the corporate context in a number of ways.
... The long-term nature of the contract, and its consequential incompleteness, also
entails an unusually high degree of legislative and judicial intervention. Such interven-
tion inevitably limits the contractual sovereignty enjoyed by shareholders. Id. at 790 (em-
phasis added).
Riley also states:
... [C]ontract provides the most appropriate model for comprehending corporations
and for comprehending corporations and for theorizing the relationship between cor-
porate actors .... However, . . . the peculiarities of that relationship imply that com-
plete contractual freedom is neither descriptively accurate nor normatively desirable.
The inter-shareholder contract has to be controlled by the legislature and constructed
by a judiciary alert to those peculiarities. Id. at 802.
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the realm of corporate law. Accordingly, if there is general consensus
that traditional private arrangements, or 'private ordering', can be
said to constitute 'opting out' of corporate law, then surely it can con-
vincingly be said that the utilization of dispensation powers by a cor-
porate regulator provides for 'opting out' of corporate law.
Now that the authors are satisfied that the dispensations power of a
corporate regulator, and more specifically the ASIC's power to grant
exemptions and modifications, can be characterized as a mechanism
to facilitate opting out of corporate law rules, in the next Part the
authors outline their proposal to extend the ASIC's relief powers to
provide companies with the opportunity, in defined circumstances, to
'opt out' of provisions of the Corporations Act expressing important
governance rights for shareholders.
IV. TOWARDS AN EXTENSION OF THE ASIC's EXEMPTION AND
MODIFICATION POWERS: 'QUASI-OPT OUT' OF THE
CORPORATIONS ACT
In the preceding part of this article, the authors suggested that the
statutory power provided to the ASIC to grant exemptions and modi-
fications from the operation of various provisions of the Corporations
Act may be considered as a formal mechanism to 'opt out' of these
provisions of the Act. The authors also explained, however, that, curi-
ously, very little has in fact been written about the ASIC's dispensa-
tion powers, either on a descriptive level or from a normative basis.
Another curious feature of the ASIC's powers is that they do not ap-
ply in relation to provisions of the Act providing direct participatory
rights for shareholders. Yet, as the recent events explored in part two
of this article show, it is in fact these provisions which companies have
sought to work around. In part three above, the authors provided an
explanation as to why we believe the ASIC's dispensation powers
should be considered as a mechanism facilitating opt out arrange-
ments. In this part, the authors will propose that these powers should
be extended to apply to provisions containing participatory (or 'gov-
ernance') rights for shareholders (including sections 203D and 249D
discussed above). Before doing this, however, it is important to fill in a
gap in the commentary on the ASIC powers, by briefly exploring the
history and rationale of these powers, and to determine whether there
is an explanation for why the ASIC's powers apply only selectively to
some provisions of the Corporations Act- and not to others.
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A. Commentary to Date on the ASIC's Exemption and
Modification Powers
1. History and Rationale of the Powers
The power of the corporate regulator to provide relief is said to
originally derive from the Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act 1980
("Takeovers Code"), as one of a number of important developments
in the regulation of takeovers law in Australia introduced under this
enactment. The regulator at the time, the National Companies and
Securities Commission ("NCSC") was provided with this discretion to
grant relief from the provisions of the Takeovers Code as it was read-
ily acknowledged that many provisions in the Code were quite com-
plex and volatile, and strict application of the provisions to instances
of takeover conduct could produce unintended and undesirable conse-
quences. Furthermore, it was considered impossible to construct a
black-letter takeovers law which would cover all the unforeseen cir-
cumstances which arise from takeover activity, and again the ASIC's
dispensation powers were considered important here in providing for
flexibility in takeovers regulation.
Before the adoption of the Takeover Code, there was some sugges-
tion that Australia should adopt a 'general principles' approach to na-
tional takeovers regulation like in the United Kingdom, rather than a
'black letter law' approach like in the United States. It was ultimately
settled that a 'black letter law' approach was preferable, but only on
the basis that the new regulator, the NCSC, would have discretionary
power to grant relief from the operation of takeover provisions. In
one of the first evaluations of the 1980 Takeover Code and its provi-
sions, Quentin Digby wrote that:
The enactment of the Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act 1980(Cth) heralded an important development in the regulation of cor-
porate takeovers in Australia. The National Companies and Securi-
ties Commission (the NCSC), which under the legislation became
the body primarily responsible for administering the Takeover
Code, was given an unprecedented level of discretionary power.
The principal discretions accorded to the NCSC empowered the
Commission to extend or reduce the coverage and effect of the
Code in its application to particular instances of takeover conduct.
... The 1980 Takeover Code represents a unique regulatory mix. As
had been the case with earlier codes, the law spelt out in a detailed
"black letter" form. However, to introduce flexibility and to enable
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enforcement of the "spirit" of the Code, wide discretions were
vested in the NCSC to modify the effect and coverage of the law.
63
Quentin Digby went on to explain that the dispensation powers given
to the NCSC in the Code ensured that there was a 'commercial realis-
tic approach' to the operation of the Takeover Code.
64
In the High Court of Australia's decision of ASIC v DB Manage-
ment Pty Ltd. and Others; Southcorp Wines Pty Ltd. v DB Manage-
ment Pty Ltd. and Others,65 handed down in 2000, a useful discussion
on the origins and rationale of the corporate regulator's dispensation
power was also provided. According to the Court:
Sections 57 and 58 of CASA [the Companies (Acquisition of
Shares) Act 1980 (Cth)] contained provisions corresponding to Sec-
tions 728 and 730 of the Law. Section 57 empowered the [NCSC] to
exempt a person from compliance with all or any of the require-
ments of the Code. Section 58 empowered the NCSC to declare that
the Code should have effect in its application to or in relation to a
particular person or persons in a particular case as if a provision or
provisions of the Code was or were omitted or varied or modified as
specified, and 'where such a declaration is made, the Code has ef-
fect accordingly'.
This represented a legislative response to a problem of policy
concerning regulation of takeovers. It involved a compromise be-
tween the technique of general legislative prescription applying in-
flexibility to all cases, and that of administrative discretion
addressing issues on a case by case basis. The NCSC was given
power, not merely to determine that, in certain cases, the legislative
scheme would not apply, but also to modify or vary the operation of
the scheme.... It created a new set of rights and obligations.
66
Since this relief power was first introduced in the Takeover Code, it
has over time been extended to apply to many other areas of Austra-
lia's corporations law. A similar power was considered necessary
when a complicated regime facilitating share buy-backs was intro-
duced later in the 1980's (although does not operate under the present
buy-back provisions in the Act which have been significantly rational-
ized), and has since also been utilized to provide for commercial flexi-
bility in relation to the financial reporting provisions (except the
removal of auditors under section 329) in part 2M, the fundraising
provisions (Ch 6D), provisions regulating managed investment
schemes (Ch 5C) and, most recently, was incorporated as a very im-
portant component of the financial services regime under Chapter 7 of
63. See Quentin Digby, The Principal Discretionary Powers of the National Companies and
Securities Commission Under the Takeovers Code, 3 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. 216, 217 (1984).
64. Id. at 218.
65. 33 ACSR 447 (2000).
66. Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
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the Corporations Act. The power was first vested in the NCSC, then
the Australian Securities Commission ("ASC") and now the ASIC.
Although over time the reach of the ASIC's relief powers has ex-
tended to apply to most substantive provisions under the Corporations
Act, what is very interesting is that the powers do not apply to provi-
sions in the Act containing important participatory rights for share-
holders, such as section 203D and the 100 member rule in section
249D(1). This has not been an accidental omission. When one looks at
the Corporations Act in its entirety, it is quite clear that the exclusion
of the ASIC's powers of relief from these provisions is quite deliber-
ate. For example, the ASIC is given the power to exclude or modify
the operation of particular provisions of part 2M of the Act regulating
financial reporting, however specifically excluded from this power is
the provision stating that the removal of a company's auditor(s) is to
be approved by an ordinary meeting of shareholders. Moreover, the
various rights of shareholders in relation to company meetings under
part 2G.2 (e.g. the power of 100 shareholders to requisition a share-
holder meeting under section 249D(1)) can be modified, but only by
the passage of Regulations under the Act, not by the ASIC.
As the authors are proposing to extend the ASIC's relief powers so
that they do apply to these shareholder-empowering provisions, what
follows below is a brief exploration of why the ASIC's powers have
been limited in this way, and whether these reasons act as a barrier to
utilizing and extending the ASIC's powers of relief to facilitate opt out
arrangements in relation to shareholder rights.
2. Scope of the ASIC's Powers: Why do the Powers apply to some
Provisions but Not Others?
To exclude the operation of the ASIC's relief powers from the
shareholder-empowering provisions of the Act seems to be quite an
arbitrary and unjustifiable restriction, but is there any convincing ex-
planation highlighting why the ASIC's powers are limited in this way?
The authors do not think so. Following is a brief explanation of the
main factors that could be relied upon to oppose extending the
ASIC's powers in the way the authors are intending, along with our
response to each.
a. Purpose of ASIC's Relief Powers
In the Explanatory Memorandum to the Financial Services Reform
Amendment Bill 2003, the following explanation of the origins and ra-
tionale of ASIC's powers was provided:
[Vol. 3:255
OPTING OUT OF SHAREHOLDER GOVERNANCE RIGHTS
ASIC uses its exemption and modification powers to provide ad-
ministrative relief from the operation of various provisions of the
legislation in circumstances where it judges that application of those
provisions is not warranted, or that they should apply in a modified
way. In most situations, the exemption and modification powers are
exercised in response to requests for relief from parties who are ex-
periencing difficulties complying with a particular provision of the
legislation or where the application of the provisions is not appropri-
ate in particular circumstances.
Depending on the circumstances, the strict operation of the legisla-
tion may produce unintended or unreasonable results. Moreover, ex-
emptions and modifications will often be necessary to facilitate
innovative products that were not contemplated at the time the leg-
islation was drafted, while maintaining an appropriate degree of in-
vestor protection.
The limitation mentioned above which prevents ASIC from de-
claring that a provision is modified such that it applies in relation to
a person and/or financial product to which it would not otherwise
apply presents a substantial impediment to the effective use of the
exemption and modification powers.
67
In the previous section of this article it was explained that the dispen-
sation powers of the corporate regulator were originally introduced to
provide for some flexibility in the application of very complex and
difficult provisions of the companies legislation, where unforeseen
consequences may arise from strict application of the provision(s).
Based on this, it could be argued that it is totally understandable that
shareholder-empowering provisions do not allow for modification or
exemption by the ASIC, as the provisions are typically clear and sim-
ple to apply. For example, we know that by including section 203D in
the Corporations Act, a consequence is that shareholders must be no-
tified of, and be given the opportunity to vote for or against, any reso-
lution to remove a director from office. Similarly, we know that even
in the largest of corporations, with hundreds of thousands of share-
holders, as little as 100 shareholders can demand that the company
convene a extraordinary general meeting, pursuant to section 249D(1)
of the Act. It may be at times inconvenient to the company and its
directors, but it is not an unforeseen consequence of the provision.
The above statement from the particular Explanatory Memoran-
dum also makes clear that a purpose of the ASIC's powers is to ensure
that if complex provisions cause unintended or unforeseen conse-
quences, something can be done about it. Yet, as the Explanatory
Memorandum highlights, this is only one reason for the application of
67. Explanatory Memorandum 9-10, Financial Services Reform Amendment Bill (2003)
(Austl.)(emphasis added).
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the ASIC's powers. No longer are the powers in place simply to sup-
plement black-letter takeover code provisions; the regulator's powers
now extend quite widely to provide for commercial flexibility in the
application of a range of different areas of Australian corporate law.
Relief powers can be used by the ASIC when a company has diffi-
culties complying with a particular provision or provisions of the Act,
or when the strict application of the Act would produce unreasonable
results.68 This is precisely what has occurred recently in relation to
some of the shareholder rights provisions in the Corporations Act, in
particular sections 203D and 249D, and why some companies have
attempted what is in effect opt out arrangements to try and avoid the
operation of these provisions. Accordingly, the authors believe it is
quite justifiable to at least make available the option of avoiding the
strict application of shareholder rights provisions. There will, of
course, need to be safeguards built into an extension in the ASIC's
powers in this way, and this is provided for in the authors' proposal
outlined below.
b. Replaceable Rules
Another explanation that may be raised for why the ASIC's relief
powers do not apply to shareholder participatory rights, is that such
rights relate to the internal governance arrangements of the corpora-
tion, and provisions dealing with these arrangements are included as
'replaceable rules', which shareholders can essentially 'opt out' of al-
ready. As was explained earlier in this article, in 1998 the old Table A
provisions was replaced with 'replaceable rules'. Section 141 provides
quite an extensive list of the provisions in the Act which are 'replacea-
ble rules'. The company can 'opt out' of a replaceable rule by includ-
ing alternative arrangements in the company's constitution, which
requires the approval of a special resolution of shareholders. Only
provisions which are designed to assist companies in organizing the
internal governance arrangements within the organization are 're-
placeable rules'.
Accordingly, the argument would be as shareholder participatory
rights do relate to the internal governance relationship between com-
panies and its shareholders, if it is felt that there should be some ave-
nue for companies to 'opt out' of a shareholder right if it produces
difficulties or unintended consequences, the provision should simply
be amended to become a replaceable rule, rather than attaching a dis-
68. So long as the relief is consistent with ASIC's general policy towards relief applications
under Policy Statement 51, which states that ASIC will consider granting relief were the regula-
tory detriment is minimal and is clearly outweighed by the resulting commercial benefit.
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pensation power to be exercised by the ASIC. The authors believe
that this is probably the strongest argument against extending the
ASIC's dispensation power to apply to shareholder rights, given that it
involves some input by shareholders and would certainly simplify cor-
porate regulation given that there is a workable replaceable rules re-
gime already in operation.
The authors believe, however, that providing for flexibility in the
application of shareholder rights provisions through an the ASIC re-
lief power, rather than by expanding the replaceable rules regime,
would provide for greater shareholder protection and participation.
This will become clear when the authors outline and explain their pro-
posal for law reform below, in particular when we explain that a 'spe-
cial majority' of shareholders will be required to approve any relief
application, and the ASIC will need to absolutely satisfied that grant-
ing relief (in the form of an exemption or modification) would be in
the best interests of shareholders as a whole for the duration of time
in which relief is granted.
Thus, the authors do not consider the existence of the replaceable
rules regime in the Act to be any reason not to go ahead with our
proposed extension of the ASIC's dispensation powers to apply to
shareholder rights which form part of the internal governance ar-
rangements of the corporation.
c. Avenue for Corporations Regulations in Shareholder
Rights Provisions
In part three, reference was made to the fact that there are a few
provisions in the Act-especially provisions in Pt 2G.2 giving share-
holders certain participatory rights in relation to company meetings-
which allow for modification of shareholder rights, yet by way of mak-
ing regulations under the Act, rather than through ASIC relief. For
example, section 249D(1A) allows for the modification of the rule
contained in section 249D(1) allowing shareholders to call an ex-
traordinary general meeting.
Therefore, at least in relation to those provisions where there is the
option available of making regulations to modify a particular share-
holder right, it could be argued that the ASIC's dispensation powers
are not required. Isn't it more desirable that the Government, which is
elected by the people and is subject to public scrutiny, should be given
the authority to modify or exclude important participatory rights of
shareholders, rather than delegating this power to a corporate regula-
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tor which is un-elected and subject to very little public scrutiny? 69
Notwithstanding the availability of this regulation-making power,
there are, however, a number of reasons why the authors believe a
dispensation power is required.
Perhaps the strongest reason why the regulation-making power is
not an effective substitute for an the ASIC dispensation power is due
to the difficulty in actually getting regulations enacted. First, the Gov-
ernment needs to be satisfied that there is a case for the making of
regulations to modify the operation of a shareholder rights provision,
which is going to be unlikely due to effective shareholder participation
being such an important objective in corporate law reform. Any pro-
posal to limit or restrict the application of a shareholder right, even if
such limitation or restriction would be in the overall best interests of
shareholders, would not be picked up. Furthermore, if a proposal to
amend a rule through regulations is adopted, there is still a strong
chance that any measure which ostensibly reduces the rights of share-
holders would be disallowed by the Parliament. This was seen with the
difficulties the Howard Government had back in 2001 in trying to
amend the 100 member rule in section 249D(1) through regulations.
The Senate disallowed the making of that particular regulation as it
was considered to impact adversely on shareholders, in particular mi-
nority shareholders.
Due to these difficulties with the political process, the application of
this regulation-making power is not considered a realistic option by
companies to modify the strict operation of the shareholder rights
provisions in the Act. This is demonstrated by the fact that Boral, in
the example discussed in Part Two of this article, resorted to a consti-
tutional amendment- relying on section 136(3)- to try and work
around the application of sections 249D and 249N of the Act, rather
than approach the Government to introduce regulations so that the
100 member rule in these provisions would be modified for Boral.
What is also a significant weakness of the regulation-making option
to avoid or modify certain statutory shareholder rights is that there is
no requirement to consult shareholders or for shareholders to approve
a modification of a particular shareholder right through regulations.
As discussed above, an important feature of the regulation-making
power is that regulations can be made for a particular company, or a
particular class of companies. Therefore, if say Telstra or Optus ap-
proached the Government to amend by regulations the 100 member
69. See Bottomley, supra note 52 (for an excellent recent exploration and evaluation of the
increase in delegated law-making in corporate law).
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rule in section 249D(1) to increase the threshold requirement to
10,000 shareholders, the Government drafted regulations to this effect
and they were not disallowed by the Senate, the rights of shareholders
would be significantly impacted upon, without a shareholder vote on
this change, and perhaps without shareholders even being notified un-
til the following annual general meeting of the company. This does not
seem to be consistent with strong shareholder democracy or effective
corporate regulation.
While it is usually the case that shareholder approval is also not
required for the ASIC to grant relief in the form of an exemption or
modification from a rule, under the authors' proposal for extending
the ASIC's dispensation power to apply to shareholder participatory
rights, it will be a requirement that a special majority of the relevant
company's shareholders must first support the relief application. The
ASIC will also need to be satisfied that the relief application relating
to a shareholder right will be in the best interests of shareholders as a
whole before relief can be granted. Accordingly, in terms of ensuring
that shareholders are adequately informed and participate in any pro-
posal to modify their statutory rights, the authors' proposed use of the
ASIC's dispensation power is certainly preferable to the use of regula-
tions to achieve flexibility in the application of these shareholder
rights.
B. Structuring the Author's Ldw Reform Proposal
1. Overview of the Author's Proposal
It has been noted a number of times in this article that the ASIC's
power to grant exemptions and modifications does not attach to provi-
sions of the Corporations Act containing shareholder governance
rights, and that the authors intend to extend the ASIC's powers so
that they do apply to provisions of the Act dealing with these share-
holder rights. In the previous section of this article, the authors pro-
vided some explanation for why the ASIC's powers have not to date
applied to these provisions. As will be explored below, we do not be-
lieve that this explanation justifies limiting the ASIC's powers in this
way. Given that the two key recent examples of opting out of corpo-
rate law in Australia both related to provisions of the Act containing
such shareholder governance rights, it is obviously important to focus
on this development, and consider how to respond in the best possible
manner to ensure effective regulation.
At this point, so that readers begin to understand exactly what the
authors are proposing, it is important to provide a brief summary of
2005]
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the authors' proposal, which will be clarified in more detail below.
The main features of the proposal are:
* The ASIC's existing power to grant exemptions or modifications
from the Act will be extended to apply to provisions containing
'governance rights' exercisable by shareholders. The concept of
'governance rights' is defined below.
" The bulk of the detail about how the ASIC will approach applica-
tions for relief from these 'governance rights' provisions of the
Act will be contained in a Policy Statement to be issued by the
ASIC, after consultation with the Department of Treasury (with a
memorandum of understanding drafted following this consulta-
tion). Key features to be contained in the Policy Statement will
be:
o (a) in order for relief to be granted, a 'special majority' of
shareholders of the company will need to approve of the
application for relief.
o (b) the ASIC can set the duration of time for which relief is
granted, with the maximum time being five years.
o (c) in all applications for relief to the ASIC, the company will
need to outline their case as to why the proposed exemp-
tion or modification is in the best interests of shareholders
as a whole.
o (d) all declarations of relief, being either a modification or ex-
emption from a provision of the Act containing a govern-
ance right for shareholders, will contain a condition that
relief will only continue while it is being utilized by the
company in the best interests of shareholders. The ASIC
will be able to withdraw a declaration of exemption or
modification at any time if it is satisfied that the company is
abusing the exemption or modification.
Given that an application for an exemption or modification from the
operation of express shareholder governance rights needs to be ap-
proved by a special majority of shareholders, and the ASIC will only
be able to approve an application if it is satisfied that the relief will
operate in the best interests of shareholders, it is envisaged that the
main provisions where relief will be sought and granted would be sec-
tion 203D (in situations where- like with the National Australia Bank
example- convening a general meeting to vote on a resolution for re-
moval of a director is considered a major inconvenience to all stake-
holders in the company), and the '100 member rule' in section 249D-
which it is regularly argued gives too much power to minority share-
holders in large corporations where 100 shareholders is but a fraction
of a fraction of the entire shareholder base.
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2. Scope of the Authors' Proposal
In the above outline, reference is made to the 'governance rights' of
shareholders. But what are the authors referring to when using this
term? Does this mean any provision in the Act which empowers
shareholders in some way?
To provide some context for what the authors are describing, it is
useful to start with a working definition of 'corporate governance'. In
his Report to the Royal Commission into the HIH Collapse, Justice
Owen attempted to define the concept in this way:
While numerous renditions of the term can be found in the litera-
ture, many of them useful, corporate governance is not a term of
art. At its broadest, the governance of corporate entities compre-
hends the framework of rules, relationships, systems and processes
within and by which authority is exercised and controlled in corpo-
rations. It includes the practices by which that exercise and control
of authority is in fact affected.
The relevant rules include applicable laws of the land as well as the
internal rules of a corporation. The relationships include those be-
tween the shareholders or owners and the directors who oversee the
affairs of the corporation on their behalf; between the directors and
those who manage the affairs of the corporation and carry out its
business, and within the ranks of management, as well as between
the corporation and others to whom it must account, such as
regulators.70
The emphasized part of the above extract states that the concept of
corporate governance encapsulates, amongst other things, the rela-
tionship between the shareholders and the directors in relation to the
oversight by directors of the affairs of the corporation on the share-
holders' behalf. The 'governance rights' of shareholders are therefore
the rights provided to shareholders so that they have a sense of em-
powerment and participation within the corporation to ensure that di-
rectors do have the interests of shareholders in mind when overseeing
the corporation. The OECD, its recently-revised Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance (released in April 2004) referred to such rights as
being 'fundamental' rights which facilitate effective shareholder par-
ticipation in the corporation,71 and Australia's Companies and Securi-
ties Advisory Committee ("CASAC"), in its June 2000 report,
Shareholder Participation in the Modern Listed Public Company, ex-
70. HIH Royal Commission Report available at http://www.hihroyalcom.gov.au/finalreport/
Chapter%206.HTML (emphasis added).
71. Revised OCED Principles of Corporate Governance, available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf
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plained that these rights arise by making shareholder approval a re-
quirement for certain 'key decisions' made by the corporation. 72
In defining the governance rights of shareholders in this way, for
the purposes of this article it is important to make a few things clear.
First, the concept of governance rights strictly relates to 'rights'- while
the remedies available to shareholders (for example, section 1324 in-
junctions, the oppression remedy, and a number of other commercial
remedies) might also empower shareholders and facilitate a par-
ticipatory role for shareholders in the corporation, we exclude such
remedies from our proposal. Secondly, the authors strictly confine
their concept of 'governance rights' to those rights expressed in the
Corporations Act. The concept does not extend to rights available to
shareholders under common law or in equity, or under other statutory
schemes. Third, we exclude all the provisions of the Corporations Act
which are expressed to be 'replaceable rules', or which include a
clause stating 'unless the company constitution provides otherwise'
(e.g. the procedure for varying and canceling class rights under Part
2F.2) from the concept of 'governance rights'. While some of these
provisions may provide some sense of empowerment to shareholders
in relation to the internal affairs of the company (e.g. the replaceable
rule in section 201G that shareholders must assent to the election of a
director to the company), companies and their shareholders can al-
ready 'opt out' of these provisions through including alternative ar-
rangements in the company's constitution, and we do not see any need
to change this system. Fourthly, the authors exclude from the concept
of 'governance rights', rights which form part of mechanisms under
the Act in where court approval or authorization is required. Exam-
ples include the right of shareholders under section 247A to apply to
inspect the books of a company or managed investment scheme, and
the right of shareholders to vote on a scheme of arrangement (usually
designed to effect a merger of two companies) under part 5.1 of the
Act. It is the opinion of the authors that court oversight in relation to
these procedures, particularly for schemes of arrangements under part
5.1 which are heavily supervised by the court, ensures that they are
utilized in the best interests of shareholders already, and therefore re-
placing court supervision with the ASIC supervision would not pro-
vide any major benefit to shareholders. Finally, the 'governance
rights' which the authors are referring to in this article are provisions
for which the ASIC's exemption and modification powers do not al-
72. CASAC's report available at http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byHeadline/PDF-
Final+Reports+2000/$file/
ShareholderParticipation-in theModernListed_Company,june_2000.pdf
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ready attach (which is not significant because, as discussed, the powers
do not at this time attach to shareholder rights).
In establishing these parameters, it is important to now outline the
particular provisions in the Corporations Act which the authors be-
lieve contain 'governance rights', as defined, for shareholders. We be-
lieve that the following provisions contain the entirety of shareholder
governance rights in the Corporations Act,7 3 however we certainly re-
main open to including in our proposal any further provisions which
fit within the parameters of 'governance rights' mentioned above. The
relevant provisions are:
" Section 136(2)- Shareholders must approve amendments to the
company's constitution through a special resolution.
* Sections 200B and 200E- Termination benefits under Pt 2D, Div 2
require the approval of members (approval under s 200E).
" Section 203D- Shareholders are given the power to remove direc-
tors through an ordinary resolution. As a consequence of attach-
ing a dispensation power to section 203D, it is also proposed that
section 203E- stating that a resolution, request or notice by direc-
tors of a public company purporting to remove a fellow director
from office is void- would also be amended to include a dispensa-
tion power, even though the section does not strictly contain a
'governance right'. 74
" Chapter 2E- Section 208 of the Act provides that shareholder ap-
proval of non-exempt related party transactions is required in ac-
cordance with the procedure under sections 217-227.
" Section 249D(1)- The directors of a company must call and ar-
range to hold a general meeting on the request of:
ii. members with at least 5% of the votes that may be cast at the
general meeting; or
iii. at least 100 members who are entitled to vote at the general
meeting.
* The equivalent provision to section 249D(1) for members of man-
aged investment schemes- section 252B.
" Section 249F(1)- Members with at least 5% of the votes that may
be cast at a general meeting of the company may call, and arrange
to hold, a general meeting. The members calling the meeting must
pay the expenses of calling and holding the meeting.
* The equivalent provision to section 249F(1) for members of
managed investment schemes- section 252D.
73. We base this conclusion on the examples of such rights referred to in the OECD's Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance and the CASAC's report on shareholder participation, supra notes
72-73, and also the parameters set out supra.
74. One of the authors has also written recently that the law with the removal of directors
should be changed so that companies can 'opt out' of the procedures under Section 203D by
incorporated a performance assessment policy in the corporate constitution, which facilitates
removal by the board if a director falls below certain performance criteria. See McConvill, supra
note 9. That proposal builds upon, rather than conflicts with, the authors' proposal in this article.
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" Section 249N(1)- Shareholders with at least 5% of the votes that
may be cast on a resolution or at least 100 shareholders who are
entitled to vote at a general meeting, may give a company notice
of a resolution that they propose to move at a general meeting.
* Section 249P(1)- Shareholders may request that a company give
to all its members a statement provided by the shareholders mak-
ing the request about a resolution which is proposed to be moved
at a general meeting, or any other matter that may be properly
considered at a general meeting. Under subsection (2), the re-
quest must be made by: (a) members with at least 5% of the votes
that may be cast on the resolution, or (b) at least 100 members
who are entitled to vote at the meeting.
* The equivalent provision to section 249P(1) for members of
managed investment schemes- section 252L.
" Part 2J.2- Provisions for the approval of various transactions af-
fecting share capital (including shareholder approval of reduc-
tions of capital under section 256C, ordinary resolution for non-
selective buy-backs- see section 257C, and a special resolution for
selective buy-backs- see section 257D, and shareholder approval
for non-exempt financial assistance under section 260A).
" Section 329- Removal of auditors by resolution of the company at
a general meeting.
The authors have included sections 249D, 249F, 249N and 249P in our
list, and the equivalent provisions applying to managed investment
schemes, despite the fact that with these provisions they can already
be modified through the passage of regulations under the Act. As the
authors have already noted above, however, the regulation-making
power is not really an effective mechanism for opting out of a provi-
sion due to the difficulties involved in getting the Government to pass
regulations.
In the course of thinking about, researching for and developing this
article, there was one question which weighed heavily on the minds of
the current authors: what should be the scope of our proposal? If we
are to propose utilizing and extending the ASIC's relief powers in or-
der to facilitate opt out arrangements in relation to the governance
rights of shareholders expressed in the Corporations Act, should this
proposal apply to all the above-mentioned governance rights, the ma-
jority of governance rights, or only a select few? If the proposal is to
apply to only certain express governance rights, what is going to be
the basis for determining which rights will be covered by the proposal,
and which rights will not be?
It must be said that the initial feeling of the authors was that the
proposal would need to be confined in some way: perhaps only apply-
ing to the provisions of the Act which companies have recently en-
tered into arrangements to avoid- sections 203D and 249D section
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249N 75. Why extend the proposal any further when these seem to be
the only express shareholder rights which companies have sought to
work around? Further, isn't it too simplistic to say that the ASIC's
power of relief should apply across the board to all the governance
rights mentioned above? Wouldn't this be too much of an intrusion
upon shareholders' rights? On this issue, the authors also considered
whether the governance rights of shareholders which already allow for
'opting out' through the passage of regulations should, like the re-
placeable rules under the Act, be excluded from the authors' propo-
sal.76 Ultimately, given the difficulties highlighted in part two in
utilizing this regulation-making power, the authors resolved that these
provisions should also be included as part of the proposal.
At a general level, the authors also spent some time reflecting on
whether it is actually necessary in the first place to facilitate opting out
arrangements in relation to express shareholder rights included in the
Corporations Act. The nature of most governance rights included in
the Corporations Act (the main exception being the procedure for re-
moving directors of public companies under section 203D) is that they
do not automatically apply; rather shareholders are given the opportu-
nity to choose whether or not they will exercise a particular right. Ac-
cordingly, for most governance rights, an opt out arrangement will not
be required, as the relevant provisions containing these rights are not
mandatory provisions- rather, they are essentially in the form of 'ena-
bling' provisions which shareholders can opt into or chose not to do
so. For example, shareholders are not forced to exercise their right to
inspect the register of members.
That said, shareholders' governance rights must be considered in
the context of the overall operation of the corporation, which exists
not to sprinkle rights upon individual shareholders, but rather to ben-
efit shareholders as a whole. The governance rights of shareholders
are not solely the concern of individual shareholders; rather we must
consider the impact of these rights on the corporation and the major-
ity of shareholders. The utilization of a governance right may benefit
an individual shareholder or small group of shareholders, but ulti-
mately be detrimental to the interests of shareholders as a whole.
Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that if the utilization of a gov-
ernance right by an individual shareholder would be detrimental to
the interests of the overriding majority of shareholders, the majority
should have some avenue to avoid or modify the application of that
75. See Part II, supra.
76. The 'one hundred member rule' for requisitioning a company meeting or proposing a
resolution at a meeting. See Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 249D and 249N (Austl.).
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right. Using simple parlance, the majority should rule. Thus we see
that there is an avenue for extending the ASIC's dispensation powers
to the governance rights of shareholders expressed in the Act. As was
discussed above when outlining the authors' proposal for reform, and
which will be explained in more detail below, a key feature of the
authors' proposal for law reform is that in extending the ASIC's pow-
ers to cover provisions containing shareholders' governance rights, a
special majority of shareholders would need to approve of the exemp-
tion from or modification to a special shareholder right before the
ASIC could decide to approve the exemption or modification.
Because of this extra requirement, there would be little or no value
in the company going through with an application for exemption or
modification if on only one occasion the application of a shareholder
right would have unfavorable consequences for the general body of
shareholders. Rather, an application for modification or an exemption
would need to be for a sizeable period (at least a couple of years) to
have a real tangible benefit for the company. On this basis, the au-
thors see no problem in expanding the coverage of the ASIC's dispen-
sation powers to apply to all the governance rights of shareholders,
including the requirement for a special resolution of shareholders to
amend the company's constitution. Let us explain why.
Having a requirement that a special majority of shareholders (say
90%, see discussion below) must approve of the plan for an express
governance right to be excluded or modified in some way means that
companies will usually have to structure the relief proposal so that it
extends over a sizeable period to make the time and expense of ob-
taining shareholder approval for the relief worthwhile. Therefore, if a
proposal which involves limiting or restricting the operation of share-
holders' governance rights for such a period of time is to receive the
approval of a special majority of shareholders, the company will have
to demonstrate that there are significant benefits for shareholders in
dispensing with their rights in the manner proposed. On most occa-
sions, the benefits involved would not justify such a substantial intru-
sion into shareholders' governance role in the corporation, and
therefore would be rejected by shareholders, or would not even be
proposed by the company in the first place. If there are such demon-
strable benefits to a significant majority of shareholders, and the pro-
posed modification or exemption is approved by such a majority, then
the authors see no reason in a company or companies being granted
an exemption or modification to a particular right of shareholders.
Another important feature of the authors' proposal which supports
applying the ASIC's dispensation power to all the express governance
[Vol. 3:255
2005] OPTING OUT OF SHAREHOLDER GOVERNANCE RIGHTS 305
rights of shareholders mentioned above, rather than limiting the pro-
posal to only some rights, is that before an opt out arrangement is
approved, the ASIC will closely scrutinize the exemption or modifica-
tion to ensure that is in the best interests of shareholders as a whole.
This encompasses any minority shareholders who were not repre-
sented in the special majority of shareholders who voted in support of
the proposal. There are occasions when shareholders are rationally
apathetic when voting (believing that however they vote will not have
much impact on the outcome of the resolution), or are not sufficiently
informed about the resolution which they voted on, and therefore the
ASIC's oversight ensures an added degree of protection for
shareholders.
Accordingly, no matter what shareholder governance right is sought
to be opted out of, whether it be voting to approve of amendments to
the company constitution or deciding whether a director should be
removed from office, the ASIC will not approve of any form of ex-
emption or modification unless it is comfortable that the interests of
shareholders are more favorably represented, and will not be ad-
versely affected, by granting the exemption or modification. There-
fore, there shouldn't be any concern in applying the dispensation
power as widely as possible, because if an application for modification
or exemption will only ever realize if there is overwhelming share-
holder support for the proposal and the ASIC is satisfied that it is in
the best interests of shareholders for relief to be granted, what logical
sense is there in complicated things by saying that the power applies
to some rights but not others?
One response to this is that the concern is not necessarily with the
immediate reason or circumstance that led the company to propose
opting out of a particular shareholder right or numerous shareholder
rights, but rather the long-term implications of limiting or completely
removing a shareholders' right(s). For example, in reliance upon the
factual scenario of the recent NAB boardroom battle, suppose that
shareholders approve a resolution to enable the board of a public
company to remove a director through the passage of a vote of no-
confidence, thus bypassing the operation of section 203D. Sharehold-
ers approve this resolution due to the time and cost that has been
involved in convening extraordinary meetings in the past to vote on
resolutions for removal (given that there are over 2 million sharehold-
ers in the company), and the ASIC support the company's action for
the same reasons, believing that this means the exemption from Sec-
tion 203D is in the best interests of shareholders as a whole. That's all
fine and reasonable, but what if a small gang of directors (comprising
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a simple majority of the board) then use the ASIC's exemption to
remove all the remaining directors on the board whom they don't like
because, say, they went to Melbourne Grammar School rather than
Scotch College, even though those directors had done a good job in
terms of increasing profits and producing a healthier share price?
Surely such a mutiny within the boardroom is not in the best interests
of the company. But what can be done about it?
The authors certainly recognized in constructing our proposal that
this potential problem could arise, which is why- as part of our propo-
sal- the ASIC would have the authority to actually withdraw an ex-
emption or modification at any time, if the ASIC considers that the
exemption or modification has been utilized by the company or its
directors in a manner contrary to the best interests of shareholders. At
present, with the ASIC's existing relief powers, when the ASIC grants
approval of an exemption or modification, it will often do so subject to
certain conditions, upon which if those conditions are not satisfied, the
particular exemption or modification will not be available. Given that
the interests of shareholders is what the ASIC will principally be con-
cerned about when scrutinizing a proposed application for relief, and
when structuring an exemption or modification from a shareholder
governance right, it is envisaged that a key condition that the ASIC
will impose is that the relief only applies to company actions that are
(in the opinion of the ASIC), in the best interests of shareholders as a
whole. Accordingly, once the ASIC is alerted to any outlandish be-
havior by the company or its directors relating to a matter for which
relief was granted, the relief will cease then and there. Another impor-
tant feature of the authors' proposal which should limit the instance of
abuse of an exemption or modification occurring is that relief will only
be for a limited occasion, not exceeding five years (in most instances,
however, it is envisaged that relief will be for the maximum period of
five years so that the application was worthwhile). Due to this con-
fined period of relief, therefore, instances of abuse will not be allowed
to continue in perpetuity, and companies will seek to avoid any abuse
to ensure that when it comes time to renew a modification or exemp-
tion, the ASIC will not oppose relief.
Therefore, the necessary structures are in place to protect share-
holders at all times if relief in the form of modification or an exemp-
tion is approved by the ASIC, and thus there is no strong reason to
limit the authors' proposal in any way so that it only applies to some
provisions containing shareholders rights and not others.
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C. Details of the Authors' Proposal
1. General
a. Extension of the ASIC's Relief Power
When one looks at the ASIC's existing dispensation powers in the
Corporations Act, what can be seen is that they provide very little de-
tail. Usually the provision will simply say that the ASIC can provide
individual relief on a case-by-case basis from a particular provision or
provisions of the Act, or class order relief, and typically will also pro-
vide that the ASIC can provide relief subject to conditions.77 Informa-
tion about what considerations the ASIC takes into account when
determining whether to grant relief, how companies go about applying
for relief, and what companies need to include in an application for
relief are instead contained in the ASIC policy statements- with the
main Policy Statement dealing with applications for relief being PS
51.78
With the authors' proposal, it is intended the dispensation provi-
sions be similarly brief, and simply state that the ASIC can grant relief
in the form of an exemption or modification in relation to the relevant
provision(s), and that general conditions be imposed on a declaration
for relief. While, however, a number of existing dispensation provi-
sions facilitate both individual case-by-case relief and class order re-
lief, the authors' proposal will only provide for companies' individual
case-by-case relief. Given that the purpose of the proposal is to allow
shareholders of a particular company, rather than all companies or a
class of companies, some flexibility to decide whether the strict appli-
cation of an express shareholder right is warranted in the circum-
stances of that particular company, it is not appropriate to grant wider
relief to, say, all companies within a particular industry. It is only one
company's circumstances which justifies the granting the relief. There
will be occasions where more than one company in a class may experi-
77. See Corporations Act, §§ 655A(1) (for relief from Chapter 6 (takeovers)), 669 (for relief
from Chapter 6CA (compulsory acquisition)), 741(1) (for relief from Chapter 6D (fundraising)),
and 1020F(1) (for relief from Chapter 7 (financial services reform)).
78. ASIC Policy Statement 51, Applications for Relief, (1996) (Austl.) Contains ASIC's gen-
eral policy in relation to applications for relief under the Act, with the statement providing that
[PS 51.41]:
When considering new policy applications the [ASIC] attempts to weigh the commer-
cial benefit and any net regulatory benefit or detriment which would flow from granting
the sought relief on the conditions proposed. The [ASIC] will grant relief where:
(a) it considers that there is a net regulatory benefit; or
(b) the regulatory detriment is minimal and is clearly outweighed by the resulting com-
mercial benefit.
2005]
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ence the same difficulties with the strict application of an express
shareholder right. However, the authors believe that when this is the
case, each company should individually demonstrate that relief would
be in the best interests of its shareholders.
In designing the proposal so that the new dispensation provisions
would be consistent in design with the existing provisions in the Act, it
is intended that the full details of when and how these provisions can
be utilized will be included in a new the ASIC Policy Statement, to
which the ASIC will refer to when determining whether to grant
relief.
b. Use of the ASIC Policy Statement
1) Background
In setting out the authors' proposal for law reform, the develop-
ment of a new ASIC Policy Statement to deal with applications for
relief from shareholder governance rights forms a very large compo-
nent of the proposal, even though the ASIC policy statements exist
outside of the Corporations Act.
It is proposed that at the same time as amendments to the Corpora-
tions Act to extend the ASIC's dispensation powers are being drafted
and passed through Parliament, the Government (more specifically,
Treasury) should and would negotiate a Memorandum of Understand-
ing with the ASIC so that it is specifically clear what will need to be
satisfied before the ASIC can grant relief pursuant to the new dispen-
sation powers of ASIC, and how the ASIC will approach applications
for relief.
The main points which are agreed upon and expressed in the Mem-
orandum of Understanding would then be incorporated into an ASIC
Policy Statement, adding flesh to the bones of the dispensation provi-
sions in the Act, and making clear what is the rationale for the ASIC's
new dispensation powers, and what requirements need to be satisfied
in order for relief to be granted. The authors initially contemplated
using regulations to set out these requirements so that there would be
complete assurance that the ASIC would work within these require-
ments in dealing with applications for relief. It was ultimately decided,
however, that if the requirements are contained in the regulations to
the Corporations Act, they would be susceptible to political
maneuverings given the sensitivity of interfering with shareholder
rights at a time when shareholder participation is proclaimed as being
such an important corporate governance objective. This was seen
quite clearly with the unsuccessful attempt by the Government in 2001
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to amend by regulations the 100 member rule in section 249D(l).
Such 'politicization' of the extended powers of the ASIC would work
to undermine the objectives of the scheme and thus would be totally
undesirable. In any event, the Memorandum of Understanding with
the Government will ensure that the ASIC exercises its new powers in
the manner intended. Whilst the document would not necessarily be
legally enforceable, the credibility of the ASIC as an effective or im-
partial regulator would be diminished if it did not act in accordance
with the Memorandum of Understanding- thus ensuring compliance.
The following features of the author's proposed extension of relief
powers will be expressed in the ASIC's Policy Statement, and taken
into account and applied each time it deals with a relief application
under the new dispensation provisions.
2) Features of the ASIC's Proposed Policy on Relief from
'Governance Rights'
a) Requirement for 'Special Majority' of Shareholders
It is not currently a feature of the ASIC relief applications that
companies need to demonstrate significant shareholder approval of a
particular exemption or modification that is sought. This is because in
most cases, any impact on the rights of shareholders is merely a secon-
dary consequence of granting relief. However, as the authors' propo-
sal involves extending the ASIC's dispensation power to cover express
shareholder rights, we believe it to be necessary and appropriate to
include, as a prerequisite to granting relief, a requirement that the
ASIC is satisfied that a 'special majority' of shareholders support the
relief application.
For the purposes of the authors' proposal, we have defined 'special
majority' to mean 90% of shareholders with voting rights. In deter-
mining the appropriate threshold requirement, the authors based their
decision on the existing 90% threshold under the compulsory acquisi-
tion provisions of the Act. Under chapter 6CA of the Act, once a
shareholder of a company, or the bidder for the company under a
takeover, has a full beneficial interest (in the case of the former) or a
relevant interest (in relation to takeovers) in 90% of the shares of that
company, they can essentially 'follow through' and acquire the re-
maining 10% of shares- so long as a fair and reasonable price is paid
for those shares. The authors' believe there is a strong similarity be-
tween our proposed statutory mechanism for relief and the existing
compulsory acquisition provisions as both mechanisms operate to take
away in some manner statutory rights of shareholders- whether it is
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rights vested in particular shares, or the right to remove a director
from office by ordinary resolution.
The 90% threshold for compulsory acquisition is considered to be
appropriate as once 90% of shareholders are in support of a particular
arrangement or have agreed to sell to a particular bidder, the 10% or
less of remaining shareholders are really holding up what the great
majority of shareholders truly want. It is very unlikely that a single
shareholder or small group of shareholders would command 90% of
the voting rights, so 90% approval (unlike, say, 75% which is the
threshold for special resolutions under the Act) means that there is
truly representative support and the small minority shareholders
should out of fairness succumb to what the great majority of share-
holders desire. The requirement under the compulsory acquisition
provisions that a fair and reasonable sum is paid to minority share-
holders for their shares ensures that the interests of these sharehold-
ers are not just ignored- rather, they are clearly protected under the
Act.
The above considerations equally apply to shareholder approval of
modifications or exemptions in relation to shareholder governance
rights to justify a 90% threshold before it is possible for the ASIC to
grant relief. In setting this 90% threshold, the authors do not think it
to be necessary, however, to convene a general meeting of sharehold-
ers to vote on a resolution seeking relief from the operation of a par-
ticular express shareholder right. We believe it to be sufficient for a
circulating resolution to be arranged, by which 90% of shareholders
would need to indicate their support for the resolution. This would
help in reducing the cost of obtaining shareholder approval for the
proposed relief.
The authors originally thought that rather than 90% approval,
unanimous approval would be the appropriate requirement for relief
to be a possibility, when one considers that the effect of granting a
modification or exemption is that the rights of all shareholders, not
just a select group, would be affected. However, while unanimous ap-
proval appears to be a desirable threshold, in reality it would be next
to impossible, if not literally impossible, to obtain 100% shareholder
support for a proposed relief application- especially in large public
corporations when there are hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of
shareholders. Some shareholders will be apathetic and simply not
vote, whilst other shareholders will vote against the resolution simply
because they don't like it (they may value having certain participatory
rights) or vote down the resolution to try and influence an alternative,
more favorable offer by the company. In relation to the difficulties of
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obtaining unanimous shareholder approval in relation to any resolu-
tion, Professor Brian Cheffins of Cambridge Law School has written
that:
.. requiring unanimous consent... is not practical. In a company
with a substantial number of shareholders obtaining the approval of
all members is likely to be time-consuming. Also, value-maximizing
changes could be blocked by shareholders who opportunistically
withhold their consent in order to extract some extra benefits for
themselves. 79
Indeed, it has even been suggested that 'supermajority' voting
thresholds, like the 90% approval threshold that the authors are
proposing, are undesirable because it becomes too difficult to ob-
tain the sufficient level of shareholder approval for a proposal. Pro-
fessor Lucian Bebchuk of Harvard Law School has recently argued
that:
One major and natural way in which the approval procedure may
be tightened is by requiring that an amendment be approved by a
supermajority rather than by a simple majority. In examining this
possibility, we should first recognize the clear undesirability of any
supermajority requirement that is close to unanimity. Because many
shareholders, aware of the very small effect of their vote, are un-
likely to bother to participate in any corporate vote, a demanding
supermajority requirement, one of 90% for example, would make it
difficult to adopt even quite desirable amendments. Furthermore,
such a supermajority requirement would likely give an undesirable
veto power to some shareholders.80
The present authors do not, however, see any problem with making it
difficult to have approved a proposal which limits the operation of
statutory rights of shareholders. A 'supermajority' requirement for
such resolutions is highly appropriate to ensure that the overwhelming
majority of shareholders are in fact in support of a proposal which will
limit their statutory rights. Thus, overall the authors are comfortable
with setting 90% as the threshold requirement.
Relevant documentation indicating that at least 90% of sharehold-
ers entitled to vote supported the relief application would need to be
provided by the company to the ASIC as part of its application of
relief.
b) Duration of Relief by the ASIC
Another important feature of the authors' proposal is that if the
ASIC does in fact decide to grant relief, after giving due consideration
of how the relevant interests of shareholders will be affected, the
79. Cheffins, supra note 25, at 238.
80. Limiting Contractual Freedom, supra note 12, at 1856.
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ASIC must indicate in the declaration of relief how long the relief
lasts. The Policy Statement will explain that all declarations of relief
will last for a set period of time, and will not exceed five years. At the
time that relief is about to expire, if the company wants the particular
relief to continue it will need to again go through the process of ob-
taining shareholder approval and the approval of the ASIC in order
for the relief to continue.
Limiting the duration of relief in this way, and requiring that com-
panies have to demonstrate that relief is warranted, helps in ensuring
that companies continue to use the exemption or modification granted
for the benefit of shareholders. Furthermore, as the composition of
shareholders in a company changes quite regularly, it is appropriate
that every so often the current shareholders in the particular company
are given a say as to whether they- rather than previous shareholders
in the company- support the limiting of their governance rights under
the Act.
On similar lines, it has recently been argued by Professor Bebchuk
that embedding 'sunset arrangements' in opt out arrangements in rela-
tion to takeover laws works for the benefit of shareholders. According
to Professor Bebchuk:
The law should make greater use of the strategy of allowing firms to
adopt some arrangements only for a certain period after they are
approved by shareholders .... Because of the board's control over
charter amendments, there is concern that entrenching arrange-
ments which were chosen at the IPO stage for an efficiency reason
will remain in place long after they outlive their value. A sunset
strategy would mean that, in such a case, there will be a resetting
after a certain period of time following the IPO. This resetting
would in turn ensure that an entrenching mechanism remains in place
only if it serves shareholder value.81
c) Case for Relief by Applicant Companies
It is the usual practice when companies apply for relief to the ASIC
that they outline their reasons why they are applying for relief, and
explain why the benefits of relief being granted sufficiently outweigh
the regulatory burden of dispensing in whole or in part with a particu-
lar provision as it applies to a particular company (or class of compa-
nies). During the process of determining whether to grant the relief,
the ASIC officer(s) involved typically will give due consideration to
the commercial reasons and justification outlined by the companies,
81. Anti-takeover Arrangements, supra note 13, at 751-2 (emphasis added).
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however are not bound to take this information into account when
making the ultimate decision as to whether relief is granted or not.
It is intended that a similar procedure will occur in relation to appli-
cations for relief under the new dispensation powers of the ASIC, yet
with some specific elements. Under the authors' proposal, the ASIC
Policy Statement will provide that when applying for relief, companies
will need to include in their applications a pro forma 'case for relief'
applicable when seeking relief from the operation of shareholder gov-
ernance rights. The pro forma 'case for relief' will specifically relate to
how the application for relief, if granted, would benefit the interests of
shareholders as a whole. It will include a series of questions, to be
addressed by the company, leading the company to clearly demon-
strate how the granting of relief would be in the 'best interests of
shareholders' as a whole.
The ASIC's Policy Statement would include an explanation of what
its understanding of the 'best interests of shareholders' means for the
purposes of these relief applications, and it is intended that in the Pol-
icy Statement, the ASIC would include hypothetical examples of what
is and what is not in the best interests of shareholders. It will be made
clear that while the 'best interests' of shareholders will be quite a
broad and flexible concept, obtaining 90% shareholder approval for
the proposed relief in and by itself will not necessarily be enough to
satisfy the ASIC that the proposal is in the best interests of sharehold-
ers as a whole. Much is written in corporate governance literature
about why overwhelming shareholder approval for a proposal does
not necessarily mean that the proposal has overwhelming shareholder
support. This is because, particularly in larger public companies, many
shareholders will simply abstain from voting due to the belief that
their vote could not possibly have any impact on the outcome of the
resolution. This is referred to as 'rational apathy'. 82 Furthermore,
many other voters may indeed vote in support of resolution, but on
the basis of misinformation (or, perhaps, sheer ignorance) about the
nature and consequences of the resolution.
Accordingly, by specifying that shareholder approval is not the only
factor to take into account when determining whether relief will be in
the best interests of shareholders, the ASIC will be invited to consider
and examine other issues and circumstances relating to the proposed
relief which shareholders themselves may not have considered or ex-
amined before voting on the resolution relating to the relief applica-
82. See, e.g., Blanaid Clarke, Corporate Responsibility in Light of the Separation of Ownership
and Control, 19 DUBLIN UNIV. L.J. 50, 56.
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tion. The ASIC oversight therefore provides an added layer of
protection for shareholders. This leads on nicely to the next key fea-
ture of the authors' proposal: the ability of the ASIC to include condi-
tions upon relief, and withdraw relief if necessary.
d) Conditions on, and Withdrawal of, Relief
A fundamentally important feature of the authors' proposal is that
whenever the ASIC decides to grant relief from statutory shareholder
governance rights, it must do so on the condition that the relief will
only apply if it is utilized in the best interests of shareholders as a
whole. Therefore, if it is relied upon contrary to the best interests of
shareholders, the relief will simply not be able, or the ASIC will be
able to apply to the Court to enforce compliance with the relief. Fur-
thermore, if the relief is taken advantage of in a way which is contrary
to the best interests of shareholders, as determined by the ASIC, the
regulator will be able to withdraw the relief at any time. The ASIC's
ability to impose conditions on relief, and withdraw relief if necessary,
will be made explicitly clear in the Policy Statement dealing with relief
applications under the ASIC's new dispensation powers.
This is not at all radical. As explained above, in relation to its ex-
isting dispensation powers, the ASIC already can and does grant relief
subject to conditions, and can withdraw relief at any time given that
the power is exercisable in the best interests of shareholders. The only
difference is that under the author's proposal, it will be a mandatory
requirement that in granting relief, the ASIC include a condition that
relief must at all times be utilized in the best interests of shareholders,
whereas at present it is totally up to the ASIC whether or not it im-
poses conditions upon relief.
This mandatory condition on applications for relief further empha-
sizes that relief is only to be granted when it is clearly for the benefit
of shareholders, and will only continue to be available so long as it is
utilized for the benefit of shareholders. If the directors of the com-
pany abuse the relief in a manner which is inconsistent with the best
interests of shareholders, or deny the application of an express share-
holder right in circumstances where this would clearly be against the
best interests of shareholders on that occasion (and the ASIC are fully
satisfied of this, even though it has previously granted relief), not only
will conditions upon relied not be satisfied, but the ASIC can actually
use this as the basis for justifying withdrawal of relief.
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2. Distinction between 'Initial Charter Stage' and 'Midstream'
Amendments:
A Relevant Consideration?
An interesting issue that the authors were presented with when re-
searching arrangements for opting out of corporate law is that com-
mentators, particularly in the United States, distinguish between opt
out arrangements adopted at 'initial charter' stage (i.e., when the com-
pany's constitution is first presented to shareholders for approval),
and arrangements adopted at 'midstream' stage- that is during the life
of the company.8 3 It is argued by some commentators that there is a
stronger case for opt out arrangements adopted at 'initial charter'
stage than at 'midstream' stage, mainly because there is a greater like-
lihood that 'value-decreasing' arrangements will be adopted at 'mid-
stream' stage. This has been illustrated by Professor Bebchuk in the
following hypothetical example:
Compare the adoption of provision X in a company's initial charter
with its adoption through a charter amendment from the perspec-
tives of the shareholders and of the party designing the provision.
Looking first at the shareholders' perspective, consider an investor
who values the company's stock at $99 with provision X but at $100
83. See, e.g., Limiting Contractual Freedom, supra note 12, at 1825:
[There are] differences between the initial charter stage and the charter amendment
stage and... differences between opting out at either stage. Because a charter amend-
ment cannot be viewed as a contract, opting out in midstream cannot be defended in
the same way as opting out in the initial charter- but not to opting out in midstream.
Id.
See also Campbell, supra note 6, at 201:
The mandatory rules debate- alternatively the contractual freedom debate- has pro-
ceeded on two distinct but related fronts. The first is the arrangements made when the
company is formed. These arrangements are laid down in the corporation's constitution
(the charter), as well as by law and by the operation of markets. The second is the
"latecomer term" or "opting out in midstream", a charter amendment proposed after
the company has been formed. The incentives of management differ across the two
stages of the corporation's life: there is the possibility of management opportunism at the
second.'
Id. (emphasis added).
For an Australian perspective, see, e.g., Whincop, supra note 12, at 193-4:
The idea that shareholders do not bear the agency costs of opting out needs to be
scrutinized at two different points. The first, which Jensen and Meckling studied, is
when a company does public by making an initial public offering ('IPO'). The offeror of
shares must take a lower price or convince the market (or the underwriter where one
exists) of the value of the proposed opt-out. . . . The other point in time is a 'mid-
stream' amendment, in which managers put a proposal to opt out to a shareholder vote
at some time after the company goes public (for example, by a change to the articles).
Critics have argued that managers can manipulate the amendment process. Also, share-
holders fail to become sufficiently informed about the nature of the change because of
their problems of acting collectively.'
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without X. If X is adopted at the initial charter stage, the investor
can take X into account when deciding whether to buy shares. Be-
cause X is introduced before he parts with his money, it cannot re-
duce the value of anything that he owns. He will buy shares only if
the required price does not exceed $99 a share. In contrast, adopting
X through a charter amendment after the investor has purchased
shares would reduce the value of stock he already owns. He would
suffer the adverse consequences of X without being compensated
for the $1 loss in value by a reduction in the shares' purchase price;
he would be unable to undo the purchase transaction and get some
of the purchase price back. 84
Another unfavorable feature of 'midstream' amendments compared
to 'initial charter' amendments is that only a special resolution is re-
quired to pass a 'midstream' amendment, whereas the unanimous ap-
proval of shareholders is required for an 'initial charter' arrangement
to opt out of corporate law provisions- also making it less likely that
opt out arrangements unfavorable to the interests of shareholders will
be adopted at this stage. Again, to quote from Professor Bebchuk:
Unlike initial charters, charter amendments cannot be viewed as
contracts; consequently, one cannot rely on the presence of a con-
tracting mechanism as the basis for upholding opt-out charter
amendments. Furthermore, the amendment process is quite imper-
fect and cannot be relied on to preclude value-decreasing amend-
ments. Although an amendment requires majority approval by the
shareholders, voting shareholders do not have sufficient incentive to
become informed. And although the amendment must be proposed
by the board, the directors' decision might be shaped not only by
the desire to maximize corporate value but also by the different in-
terests of officers and dominant shareholders.
Rational and informed shareholders forming a corporation would
recognize the desirability of an amendment procedure that permits
charter changes without unanimous shareholder consent. But they
also recognize that allowing any given opt-out freedom might pro-
duce value-decreasing amendments and thus involve an expected
cost.
85
This preference for 'initial charter' versus 'midstream' opt out ar-
rangements is certainly an important issue to consider, particularly
when the authors' proposal entails mostly 'midstream' amendments,
as companies would usually apply for relief after operating for some
time and come to believe that the application of a shareholder govern-
ance right operates contrary to the best interests of shareholders.
Given that the desirability of 'initial charter' amendments arises
mostly due to the requirement for the unanimous consent of share-
84. Limiting Contractual Freedom, supra note 12, at 1828.
85. Id. at 1400-1.
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holders, shouldn't the authors' proposal also include a requirement
for the unanimous consent of shareholders before the ASIC grants
relief?
The authors thought about this question carefully, but ultimately
resolved- as already discussed above- that the requirement for a 90%
shareholder approval threshold is more appropriate. It is expected
that, due to the provisions for which relief will be available, it will be
public companies, typically with a large shareholder base, that will be
utilizing the proposed new dispensation powers. Accordingly, a unani-
mous approval requirement would simply be too onerous for relief
applications to succeed. But isn't anything less than a unanimous ap-
proval requirement disadvantaging shareholders, especially minority
shareholders? Doesn't this mean that there is a greater likelihood that
value-decreasing opt out arrangements, which are contrary to the in-
terests of shareholders, would pass?
The authors have already explained that this would not be the case,
as the shareholder approval requirement in the authors' proposal, is
supplemented by an additional requirement that the ASIC needs to
be satisfied that the relief will be in the best interests of shareholders
as a whole before a declaration of relief can be granted. Accordingly,
there is no basis for including a unanimous approval requirement, or
developing separate procedures for opting out at 'initial charter' stage
compared to opting out at 'midstream' stage.
The key features of the authors' proposal outlined earlier, despite
making no distinction between 'initial charter' opt outs and 'mid-
stream' opt outs therefore remain acceptable.
V. CONCLUSION
Two recent events in Australia have shown that many companies
want the ability to avoid the strict application of shareholder govern-
ance rights under the Corporations Act, when the strict application of
these rights provide difficulties for the company. It was explained in
this article that companies have not blatantly opted out of these rights,
but have constructed arrangements to rely on alternative provisions of
the Act, in effect relying on one provision of the Act to avoid the strict
application of another. Such 'creative' or 'opportunistic' compliance
with the Act does not provide for effective corporate regulation, as it
is much better to try and design rules which will be fully complied
with, and still facilitate the same, or indeed improved, outcomes for
the companies that are being regulated and their stakeholders.
Taking all of this into account, in this article the authors have out-
lined a proposal for law reform which we believe will provide for
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more effective regulation in relation to shareholder governance rights.
We believe that our proposal, which involves expanding the ASIC's
dispensation powers to cover a number of shareholder governance
rights provisions (including sections 203D and 249D), will provide for
greater flexibility in the application of the provisions of the Act con-
taining these governance rights, and in doing so will simultaneously
encourage real rather than opportunistic compliance with the Act, and
will be more conducive to the best interests of shareholders as a
whole.
Shareholder participation has certainly been one of the buzzwords
in corporate law and governance regulation over the last couple of
years. It must be remembered, however, that the main reason for en-
couraging and promoting shareholder participation is that this is for
the benefit of shareholders and is intended to be in their best interests.
But some recent events in Australia have shown, and as the authors
have articulated in this article, that there are occasions where the
strict application of shareholder participatory rights will actually oper-
ate contrary to the best interests of the shareholders. When this oc-
curs, it must be remembered that shareholder participation is
intended to be synonymous with the best interests of shareholders.
Corporate law must therefore have in place a facility in this situation
to ensure that the best interests of shareholders are upheld. In this
article, the authors have proposed such a facility, and we sincerely
hope that it is adopted in the not too distant future.
The capacity to opt out of any law should not be readily conferred.
Laws by their very nature should generally be of universal applica-
tion. 86 However, there is a fundamental difference between laws that
on the one hand impose duties and those which on the other hand
confer rights or protections or facilitate the means through which citi-
zens can enter into (often) mutually beneficially transactions. 87 In the
case of the latter types of laws, citizens ought to be able to bypass the
operation of the law if, according to their assessment of the situation,
the law will have an adverse impact on their interests, especially
where the impact was unintended by the law-makers. Laws conferring
governance rights on shareholders fit neatly into the second category
of laws. Hence there should be a legal mechanism by which the opera-
tion of such laws can be circumvented.
86. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, THE LAW (Routledge 2001).
87. See HERBERT L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Clarendon Press 1961). These laws are
what Hart called 'power conferring' rules. Paradigm examples are laws relating to marriage and
the formation of contracts.
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The law reform proposal in this article will ameliorate the harshness
or inefficiencies associated with the operation of shareholder govern-
ance laws in unforeseen circumstances. However, procedural safe-
guards need to be implemented to ensure that opting out of a certain
provision does not in fact adversely affect shareholders to a greater
extent than if the law was observed. Due to the complexity of corpo-
rate regulation, shareholders will not always be appropriately placed
to make an assessment of the full ramifications associated with opting
out of a shareholder governance rights provision. The impartiality and
knowledge that the ASIC will bring to the process will ensure that a
decision by shareholders to opt out of such a law will be not be self-
defeating.

